Anarchist Discussion Forums

by **Kevehs** » Sat Apr 20, 2002 3:12 pm

After giving this a lot of thought I’m now much less worried about it then I was before, but given your last response I think you might find the following arguments much less convincing than I do. [color=green] I actually used the word "illusion" in a metaphorical sense. Apologies for confusing the discussion. I'll re-phrase the original sentence: "It seems to be that morality is to a large degree forced on an individual by the society, although forced in a subtle, invisible way, so that the individual is made to believe that s/he has adopted principles on a voluntary basis". I don’t know if this substantially changes the problem. If morality is “forced” on someone in a subtle and invisible fashion, then it stands to reason that a great number of people have no knowledge of that fact. You have come to recognize that this is the case (or more likely, you have come to recognize that it may be the case). However, it sounds like a very intricate process, and one that would be, by its nature, exceedingly difficult for us to identify. If you had two people in some hypothetical situation, and both examined their moral values, one coming to the conclusion that they were in fact adopted on a voluntary basis and offering a possible mechanism by which that occurred, and another claiming that their own values were not adopted on a voluntary basis, similarly demonstrating a valid mechanism, it would be exceedingly difficult to know which person was overlooking any subtle bias that compels them to think one way or the other (or if both of them are, or neither and each is more or less correct about their own case). [color=green] You can take -absolutely- any moral principle you like to see that it has been forced on us by the society through subjecting us to various techniques of discipline and techniques of self-formation which encourage us to embrace particular self-identities and particular lifestyles. Would any and all “techniques of self-formation” be forced on their subjects? Indeed, if they really are techniques of self-formation then there is some active part played by the subject, and I would think that would imply that in at least some cases these techniques could be voluntarily (either entirely so, or as voluntary as just about any decision can be given a background of conflicting desires, emotions, and influences). [color=green] But since you wanted a particular example, let's take "be kind to people". Just think of a child who's being subjected by her parents/teachers/etc. on a daily basis to all sorts of techniques of discipline which encourage her to adopt that moral principle. Discipline does not necessarily connote force, but since one of the meanings of the word does it might be an inappropriate choice, as it biases us toward assuming that all techniques which influence the moral character of a child are forced. Since this is what you are trying to demonstrate, it would be dishonest to assume it at the outset. [color=green] Such techniques of discipline are extremely subtle, virtually invisible, focus on details of action (e.g. parent or a teacher offering a variety of micro-rewards to a child for behaviour conforming to the moral principle and micro-punishments for non-conforming behaviour, such as encouragement, praise, verbal affirmations and disapprovals and other verbal cues, body language, etc.). Are we going to suggest that both rewards and punishments fall into the category of enforcement? I genuinely admire you Svo, so if I tell you as much with the primary motivation of simply expressing my feelings, will I necessarily have forced you in some fashion if I also recognize that by telling you that I admire you I might influence your actions? I’ll fully admit that I am influencing you through a positive reward (assuming that my admiration is some kind of reward [img]/wwwthreads/images/icons/wink.gif[/img]), but it seems to me that while influence is often conjoined with force, they are not one and the same. [color=green] In addition to being subjected to techniques of discipline, the child is being encouraged to embrace a particular subjective identity, I’m unsure of exactly what you mean. Do you mean the child is encouraged to be “good” or “bad” in character? [color=green] so she actively constitutes/(re)shapes/(re)forms herself by practices of the self. And by this it seems to me that we could not possibly be talking about absolute force. Don’t get me wrong, you technically aren’t absolutely forcing someone when you hold a gun to their head and tell them to do something, but I wouldn’t claim there is anything genuinely voluntary about the situation. You seem to have presented a good scenario in which many (most? all?) children may be going through a process similar in some regard. However, you have presented this scenario of intentional negative reinforcement along with scenarios of what I assume to be both positive and negative, intentional and unintentional reinforcements as though we are to consider them all the same in regards to this discussion. You also seem to assume that we never adopt moral values in an open and obvious manner, but I know a number of philosophy students that seem to offer a counter-example in regards to a limited number of values they have adopted. Doesn’t it seem to you as though a parent who honestly believes they are doing what is in the best interests of their child, and in the process intentionally (or perhaps unintentionally) gives positive reinforcement, is doing something quite distinct from forcing their children? [color=green] These practices are not something she invents herself, they are patterns that she finds in her culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on her by her culture, society, community. Again, you conflate suggested with imposed, as though I am supposed to react to each like they are the same in regards to voluntarily choosing our morality. Isn’t there a way to influence people in which the choices they make are neither entirely forced nor completely voluntary? Indeed, it seems to me that most of the influence we have on people the vast majority of the time is of this type, and I don’t see it as a negative thing on the whole. In some sense everything I say to you on this forum is going to influence you, regardless of whether or not my intent was to directly influence anyone at all, and some of that influence will change you in ways you never rationally considered as a character choice. In some sense of the word, that would make these changes involuntary, but then again, so is the beating of your heart. The fact that these changes are involuntary does not necessarily make them sinister in motive, nor necessarily negative in consequence, nor a matter of enforcement. You could take steps to stop the beating of your heart, and you can take steps to alter your morality. [color=green] Since the embracement of self-identity requires her active participation, she is made to believe that she has adopted the moral principle ("be kind to people" in my example, but it can be any other moral principle) on her own accord, yet in reality she's been (subtly) pressurised by the society to adopt the subjective aspiration of being kind to others. But every time I ever react in a way that you like or dislike to something that you do I am giving you the same kind of pressure! Should I just stop reacting to people in any way for fear that I am forcing them to transform their character? I was raised by parents who tried to instill many different kinds of moral values in me, both intentionally and unintentionally. Of course I didn’t volunteer myself to be molded by them, but I would be molded by them regardless of what they did just by being in their presence for any amount of time. And let us not forget that self-interest is a value as well, why should we assume it is the only value that we are born with, or the only one that should be encouraged or left alone? Some of the values my parents tried to instill in me did not stick, for whatever reason. Other values did become a part of who I am, but I rejected them later as my influences and experiences changed. Some of those values haunt me as part of my unwelcome character, while others seem gone altogether. Still other values remain to this day. Admittedly, when we start talking about changing the way people are it sounds sinister, but that is merely because we don’t immediately recognize that subtly changing the way people are is an everyday occurance, one that we cannot possibly avoid so long as we interact in any fashion, and not merely confined to science fiction novels and sociology textbooks. I think that, rather than deciding that morality should be tossed out simply because it is potentially dangerous, or because it transforms us into different people, or because it makes us very uncomfortable to think that we are altered without total foreknowledge and express approval, we should focus on the methods by which that morality comes about. Is the method forceful, or voluntary (or more or less of either)? Is the influence directed at the subject intentionally, or unintentionally (and does this distinction matter)? Is it done with the knowledge of the subject, or without them knowing (or more or less of either)? A problem here, one that I see no way around, is that the only way I know to judge these methods is through morality, and judging the method of instilling morality through moral standards is about as circular as one can get. [color=green] What bothers me is the source of the respect in question. Is the respect freely chosen by an individual, or is it a mask of social control, something that is imposed on the individual by the society through subtle manipulative techniques of discipline and techniques of self-formation (without the individual even realising that the moral principle has been forced on him/her, rather than freely chosen, and that s/he is being used as a servant for the greater good of the society)? Right! But I see no reason to assume that morality is necessarily forced, or solely a method of social control. It is just as you say above, what bothers you is the source of the respect. Similarly, I think that what bothers you should be the source of the morality, not the existence of morality itself. As a side note, couldn’t people voluntarily choose on an individual basis to “govern” their own actions according to a certain methodology, and make this decision voluntarily, but that nonetheless would manifest itself on the societal level as a method of social control? This would be a kind of social control from the ground up. [color=green] Probably, but the fact that the results would be different doesn't mean that the results produced by morality will necessarily be better than those produced by pure self-interest. Of course. [color=green] Actually, I am going to say that probably there will be negative impact on me if I kill someone, even if there is no way that others find it out. I am sure that killing someone will affect me psychologically, and I would have nightmares about the event for the rest of my life. Thus, I don't need to hold any moral principles to be negatively affected. You say this as Svo, the person who has chosen not to eat meat solely for moral reasons… Don’t you see that your morality has already influenced your reactions? If you tossed your morality out the window (assuming this is possible), and from a very early age you had many experiences with killing various animate creatures (you know, the blood, the flailing, the screams, whatever), who is to say that you would suffer any adverse psychological effects at all from killing a human being? Of course, you and I might think we would, but does a meat eater usually have nightmares or consider themselves to be psychologically damaged when they kill, clean, and cook their own meals? If so, I would think they would learn to stop doing this if they had a choice, but many do have a choice, and some of them never stop. It seems to me to be pretty evident from the fact that many people suffer no adverse reaction (or believe that they don’t anyway) from killing animals that there are people in existence who could kill human beings without having any adverse psychological reaction from their own point of view. For those people, morality and circumstance might be the only thing between them and the death or disadvantage of a large number of human beings. It certainly is one of the few things that stands between me and the death of a large number of animals. [color=blue] This is one of the reasons I reject utilitarianism, because I honestly believe that a tree has some kind of worth (though I have no idea what) irrespective of the existence of humanity. That is an irrational belief in many regards, I understand that much, but what am I to do about it? [color=green] Why -should- you do anything about it? Is the fact that a belief seems irrational a sufficient reason for rejecting the belief? In some cases? Yes. But I think you already know that it is not sufficient for me in this case. [color=blue] I suppose I could force myself to stop believing it, but I don't want to. I have seen others who have, and I don't want to be like them. [color=green] Since you've seen others who have stopped believing it (or never believed it in the first place) and you didn't like them, it may well be that you are no longer in the realm of irrational beliefs and in the realm of rational choices. Perhaps, but I have very little way of knowing if the reasons I don’t want to be like them are biased by my morality or not. If they are, then it is a choice based on an irrational influence. Please note that I’m not suggesting that irrationality is bad, I would just rather have irrational and rational motivations [color=blue] I'm not claiming that morality is the only thing that can give us a high regard for the free will of others, I'm just saying that pure self interest alone would not motivate us to have any more regard than is necessary to avoid some negative consequence or attain some positive benefit. [color=green] Maybe. But why is it a problem? It isn’t necessarily a problem, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t a problem for me, given that I am in fact a person who holds certain morals. [color=green] What's the point in giving more regard for the free will of others than is necessary to avoid some negative consequences or attain some positive benefits? If self-interest is your only consideration, then there is no point at all. However, I have a value system that suggests that everything has value in itself. Since I value my own free will (for whatever irrational reason I do), and since I value other human beings as such, it turns out that I value their free will as well. [color=green] This raises the issue of what is and is not in one's best interest (apparently this is a ground on which my little theory could be completely discredited ). Is it in my best interest to do something, which I probably should not have done, and get away with it? You slipped up here, as you imported a moral value into this hypothetical person who is only motivated through self interest: “to do something, which I probably should not have done.” Of course this “should” represented a moral value, because if it was pure self-interest then there is no reason not to do it if you can get away with it (in the sense of incurring no negative consequence). [color=green] If I often boss people around and constantly get away with it (i.e. none of the victims of my authoritarianism resists and confronts me), eventually my authoritarian tendencies may become deeply entrenched in my character and very difficult to expunge, and in the long term may lead to serious negative consequences for me. It may well be that such serious negative consequences could be prevented, had I not got away with my authoritarian behaviour too often, that it, avoiding short term negative consequences may not really be in my long-term best interest. (And it is much more difficult to determine one's long-term interests, than the sort-term ones, hence my "theory" runs into problems). Sure, but I think this just avoids the issue, there must be times in which one can be reasonably sure it benefits both their short and long term interests on the whole to disadvantage someone who does not seek to disadvantage them. It is those times that are relevant to this discussion, and those times that morality gives a different answer than self-interest (whether that answer is “better” or “worse” may be impossible for us to decide for anyone but ourselves). [color=blue] and don't value the individual in question as much as the end result of violating their freedom). [color=green] Should individuals -always- be valued more than the end result of violating their freedom? Kant would say yes, of course, as a moral imperative must be followed regardless of the contingent circumstance. I would agree with him if I wasn’t a radical skeptic, but I am. This means I have doubt, so my answer would be, “I would like to think so.” [color=green] My expectations of what consequences may come out of my actions may well be mistaken, therefore taking advantage of strangers may be against my self-interest. Sure, but so might any number of actions depending on the circumstance. Of course the variables are probably more complicated than your average daily decision when contemplating the murder or serious harm of another human being, but the rewards are often greater. This is really not all that relevant to our current discussion, it is more a matter of risk/benefit analysis, which could come up with any answer at all when it comes to the practical benefit of harming other people. It seems to me we should concern ourselves with those situations in which it is beneficial to the individual, so long as there are any at all, regardless of their rarity. [color=green] One thing we should perhaps question at this point is the value of particularly high loyalty towards those close to us. But even if we conclude that the value of loyalty is indeed great (which is far from certain), another thing we might want to question is whether the loyalty would necessarily be decreased if we start valuing people strictly in relation to us. Do you have any evidence suggesting that the loyalty may be reduced in such circumstances? Evidence? Nah… Arguments? Yes! It may or may not be the case that loyalty is especially important from a self-interest perspective, but as I intend to show that these self-interest arguments are not necessarily as compelling as they first seem, I’m not going to argue from that position. Instead, I’m going to argue from my position, that of someone who holds a moral system and finds that system both desirable and voluntary (I like my morality, I like its affect on my life, and I have good reason to believe that I could over time reject it if I wanted to). From that position, I value people in themselves, thus I value those close to me in themselves as well. As such, I think it would be a travesty if I displayed little loyalty to them in various situations just because it is unlikely to benefit me. As for determining whether or not the loyalty of those who are egocentric is reduced in many circumstances, all you need to find are those circumstances in which that loyalty can reasonably be expected not to benefit them (it seems to me these would be very numerous, but I with explicate a few if you’d like), because they would be the first to realize that it would be in their best interest not to remain loyal. [color=green] Why do you think morality cannot be enforced? [color=blue] I suppose because I believe that morality is an emergent trait of those with free will. If you force someone to do something, you violate their free will, and as such the thing they are doing can no longer by definition be moral. [color=green] I am not sure life is as simple as you seem to suggest. Now that you mention it, I’m fairly confident it isn’t. [color=green] I don't think there is a clear dividing line between being forced and freely choosing to act one way or another. Which would make your previous claim about morality being forced all the more difficult to maintain given its often (always?) subtle and invisible nature. [color=green] For every single action, I usually have tens, or even hundreds motivations. Some of them may be freely chosen by me, and some forced by other people or circumstances. Given the number and the complexity of motivations for every action, probably none of my actions is ever "moral" in the sense you are using the word "moral". From what you have said it sounds like none of your actions are purely moral, but I don’t see morality disappearing just because the issue of free will has grown more complex and morality relies on free will. We are delving into yet another subject, and brushing on a couple of the reasons I hold some Kantian philosophy. It seems to me that our discussion is long enough already, but this is particularly relevant so I guess I should lay this out. There is an old problem in philosophy that stems from determinism. The problem is basically that a purely mechanistic explaination of the functioning of the world seems to leave little or no room for the existence of anything like a “free will.” Indeed, once we accept principles like “cause and effect,” the very concept of free will seems incoherent. I should be very clear about this, for this problem to have potency you need not be a determinist at all, or even believe the above principle, it is rather than the philosophy of determinism illuminates this problem. What is free will? Is it merely the ability to act in accordance with all the events that influence our thoughts? If so, then we are like machines, we react only in accord with our stimuli and our structure. If not, what else is there that free will can be? Is it the ability to choose between one kind of influence that we prefer over the rest? If so, that preferance itself seems a result of some previous influence, and again we are as machines. Is it the ability to reject those influences and act randomly? Then it is merely random action, or a kind of continuous error generated by our structure. In any of these cases morality disappears, for how can we be moral agents if we simply do as we are programmed? (if we are not agents at all?) Genuine freedom disappears as well, for there is no value in the ability to act without restraint if we have no power to act differently than we do regardless, or if our only power is to act in a completely random fashion. In fact, under this dilemma an entire area of human culture and thought seems irrelevant, little more than the result of an error in our chemical balance that makes us believe we are capable of doing something we clearly are not. This is a brief summary of the problem, and I would be happy to pursue any objections you have, but for the many years I struggled with it I was tortured by the thought that nothing I did was “my” choice. Indeed, the true implication is that if “I” exist at all, “I” am nothing more than the passive recipient of all my values and thoughts, “I” am nothing more than a very complex machine. By many definitions of identity, this would mean that no “I” exists at all. Perhaps this isn’t a terrible thing, and I spent a very long time trying to convince myself of that, even as I desperately sought out some argument, some ability or hidden part of our experience that would act as a key to the gate of free will. I thought of the synthesis of chemicals, of the inability to determine cause and effect with accuracy on a very small or very complex scale, of machines with conciousness, of every rational argument I could comb through for some logical reason to abandon the determinist trap or find new meaning in the word “random.” Some of these struggles brought me a little comfort, sometimes I thought I was on the verge of something very big, but it never seemed to pan out in a rational way. Of course it doesn’t “need” to pan out in a rational way, and I could have learned to simply accept the fact that I believe I have the ability to alter my course through life, regardless of the evidence I can gather apart from that belief. Kant gave me the first realization that it might not be the limits of the concept of free will that makes belief in it irrational, but rather the limits in the scope of rationality to explain something as complex and real (i.e. non-representational) as free will. Kant’s position on this matter is very hard to give briefly, but I’ll give it a try. I don’t have a copy of the message I wrote about Kant previously, so some of this might be repeat for you. He argued for a distinction between the phenomenal (things which we have the ability to cognize) and the noumenal (things which are outside our ability to perceive). He gave a number of arguments for thinking that the noumenal world may exist, but he remained agnostic on the issue of whether or not it actually does exist (by its very definition we could not know). He then argued that if free will exists at all (something we cannot know), then it must be noumenal in nature, because it does not fit into any phenomenal (what I call mechanistic and is the domain of the determinists) account of the world. This means that free will is in a sense beyond rationality, it is in fact irrational, but it is only so because we lack the ability to properly conceive of it. I can’t seem to remember his move from free will to morality, but it could have been as simple as recognizing the correlation between them (the fact that if all our actions are determined then morality either could not exist or would be meaningless) and proposing that any correlation between the two would necessitate that morality is also noumenal. Alternatively, it could have had nothing to do with free will, and he might have considered morality noumenal on its own terms, perhaps because various modes of it give non-practical (non-phenomenal) imperatives, and the alternative of assuming that morality was always in accordance with practicality would make the concept redundant and useless. [color=green] Yeah, I would appreciate you showing that morality is an emergent trait of free will. It is more of an assumption of mine, I can’t imagine it being anything else. [color=green] If one is compelled, they cannot act voluntarily, can they? [color=blue] If one is compelled by an outside source, they can still resist, right? If one is compelled by an internal source, what would they be resisting? Themselves? Wouldn't it seem very strange, and perhaps circular, to claim that I violate my own free will? [color=green] You seem to equate the "internal source" compelling people to act with "free will". Not exactly. I am equating the “internal source” with their identity. I am proposing (or perhaps assuming), that if they are compelled by an internal source, it must by definition mean that they are compelling themselves in some fashion. I have another argument about the circular nature of such phrases as “calming myself down” or “self ownership” or “compelling oneself,” and how I believe it is actually a mistake to label them as such when we actually mean something different, but I can’t bring myself to make this whole thing any longer right now. Suffice for the moment to say that I am claiming that we cannot actually “compel ourselves” to do anything, rather, we simply decide to do that thing. [color=green] And what is this thing you refer to as "free will" any way? Can it be that it doesn't exist at all? Got me… This feeling I have that “I” (does that even exist?) have some influence over my presence in the world? [color=green] If it is true (as I have attempted to argue at the beginning of this post) that our subjective identities are produced partly by disciplinary powers and partly through techniques of self-formation, then it might follow that we rarely, if ever, exercise "free will". Determinism, spot on. Of course, Kant did nothing at all to suggest that free will exists, he just gave us what I believe very good reason to believe that it could exist. I require nothing more, as I already have the motivation to believe that it does exist in the form of this seemingly inescapable and incomprehensible belief that I am able to make choices apart from what circumstance compels me to do. [color=green] Sometimes s/he probably could, but not always. Or can you provide an example of a moral principle which -always- benefits not only the society but also the individual? Nope, and interestingly enough, neither can the contractarians (I believe this is one of the major flaws of their philosophy). However, unlike contractarians I need make no claim that morality will always be in the self-interest of the individual, for I do not pretend that the two are one and the same. [color=green] Maybe at least sometimes it would. Maybe it wouldn't. I have no idea. I have reasons to believe that a more cooperative society may be more oppressive and more likely to slide into totalitarianism than a less cooperative society, and thus even if greater cooperation could benefit the individual in the short term, these benefits may be far outweighed by long-term losses. Right back ‘atcha! Maybe the long-term losses (if there are any) would outweigh the short-term benefits (if there are any). Regardless, morality gives people the potential to cooperate to a much greater degree if they so choose, and they can always opt out of doing so (unless you want to propose cooperation as some kind of unavoidable imperative). This means that leaving people the option of developing moral systems gives them more options in terms of their social interaction, thus more benefit when and if the circumstance should arise that greater cooperation would benefit them on the whole and individually. If you want to argue that this is never the case, then it might make morality valueless from an egoistic perspective, but I think that would be a hard argument to back up. This is the only area I have seen thus far in which a moralist can give a self-interest benefit that the non-moral egoist can’t offer. (the moral egoist, like the contractarian, claims that they can) [color=green] I want to question the desirability of having too much trust in others. How can I respond to a sentence pre-loaded to bias toward the conclusion you are seeking to support? “Too much trust” assumes that the amount of trust we place in others given a moral system is too much, something you are seeking to demonstrate, not something I’m going to assume at the outset. [color=green] Having such trust will not guarantee that they will not take advantage of us. I agree, but I would argue that having “just the right amount of trust” in any given situation is by definition better than having “too much trust” or “too little trust.” I see no reason to see why a moral system would encourage us to have anything other than the amount of trust that a given relationship merits. Sure, mistakes of trust happen, but I don’t see my morality would contribute to these mistakes being worse or of greater quantity. [color=green] and surely that would promote cooperation to a higher degree? [color=blue] Aren't you attaching too much importance to cooperation? Perhaps. Lets just say that I would prefer the ability to cooperate to a great extent if it turned out it was in my best interest to do so. [color=blue] I am beginning to think that we might be speaking of two distinct things, things which we both formally referred to as "morality" but which this discussion might lead us to distinguish. It isn't clear for me yet. [color=green] What do you mean? What two distinct things? Didn’t I say it wasn’t clear for me yet? Perhaps I meant the kind of morality that is forced versus the kind that is not (perhaps the kind that is forced isn’t morality at all). Or maybe I meant something entirely different, it isn’t clear to me yet. [color=green] I guess I might agree with this, and even the conclusion that it makes morality more (potentially) dangerous and intrusive, but is that necessarily a bad thing? Not all intrusive things are bad, are they? I guess nothing is bad in itself. But if you admit that not all intrusive things are bad, doesn't it contradict your earlier statement: "If you force someone to do something, you violate their free will, and as such the thing they are doing can no longer by definition be moral."? Or can things be immoral and "not bad" at the same time? Perhaps, but that isn’t what I was suggesting. “Intrusive,” was definitely the wrong word to use, as I was referring to a change or influence that is uninvited, rather than one that is specifically unwelcome (i.e. perhaps some of these changes aren’t voluntarily in the sense that we don’t choose them, but aren’t involuntarily in the sense that we don’t reject them either). [color=blue] From what I can tell, their philosophy is completely identical to what you have been suggesting above, except that they believe this philosophy of pure self-interest is a form of morality. [color=green] They may be right. It probably is a form of morality. But as I said, I don't know anything about that theory. Nah, they are off the wall on that one, but that is a different discussion. Here is the link: http://www.againstpolitics.com/the_libertarian_idea/narveson_online_articles.html And if you find out what is with the picture of the woman with the gun, please tell me, as I am baffled. One last bit to add to this monster. I talked quite a bit above about morality being irrational, mostly determined because morality does not always act in our own self-interest. This was very stupid of me, especially as I already determined that this was not the case a long time ago (I need to spend more time going over my foundational arguments). Put simply, there is nothing inherent in rationality or logic which compels us to follow our self-interest. Really. It is in no way “rational” or “more rational” to choose our own self-interest above the interests of anything or anyone else. If I choose to supercede my motivation with the motivation of something else, I have violated no laws of logic. The only way that egoists can suggest otherwise is to repeat their claim must be the case over and over again. Since acting in our self-interest is not in itself rational, acting against our self-interest is not irrational, and thus belief in morality itself is only irrational because of the deterministic problem above. Some propertarians falsely claim that “self-interest” does not mean “interest in myself,” but rather “interests I hold.” If this is the case it would indeed be irrational to act against the interests that we hold all things considered, as we would have no motivation to do so, but even then it would not be irrational to hold interest in something other than ourselves above any interest in ourselves. (and to prevent a very silly discussion from generating here: no, there is nothing inherently rational about survival, unless someone wants to give a logical necessity argument that there is)

by **ThePeccary** » Sat Apr 20, 2002 3:38 pm

It seems to me to be pretty evident from the fact that many people suffer no adverse reaction (or believe that they don’t anyway) from killing animals that there are people in existence who could kill human beings without having any adverse psychological reaction from their own point of view. This seems to me to be a non-sequitur. If any number of the psychologists who believe in a supego in the human mind are right, then killing a human being is very different from killing an animal. Of course, there are people in existence who could kill human beings without having any adverse psychological reaction from their own point of view, Hitler was one of them. He was, of course, a vegetarian.

by **Kevehs** » Sat Apr 20, 2002 10:16 pm

[color=green] This seems to me to be a non-sequitur. If any number of the psychologists who believe in a supego in the human mind are right, Something we need not believe, and thus canceling any reason to assume my statement was a non-sequitur. Remember, logical fallacies don't rely on contingent facts, only the structure of the argument itself. It is theoretically possible (even if you personally consider it to be highly implausible), that those who are not psychological fazed by the murder/death of an animal would also not be psychologically fazed by the murder/death of a human, for the same basic reasons. [color=green] then killing a human being is very different from killing an animal. Are you saying that it is very different because the humans being killed have a superego, while non-human creatures do not? Or is your claim that the person doing the killing has a superego and thus will recognize that the human they are killing has one as well? In either case I think there are arguments to the contrary. However, the entire debate (and therefore the point I made to Svo) is rather meaningless to the discussion above, because it isn't actual psychological damage we are concerned about. Rather, our focus should be the perceived psychological damage of those who kill human beings. I think it is evident that there exists human beings who believe they incur no psychological damage when they harm or kill other human beings. As such, the egoist argument implies that it is quite possible that it will sometimes be in the advantage of such people to kill others who meant them no harm, merely for their own personal gain.

by **ThePeccary** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:34 am

Something we need not believe, and thus canceling any reason to assume my statement was a non-sequitur. Yeah, I should have mentioned this, but the superego thing was just a 'for example'. Still, it doesn't necessarily follow that, because humans can kill animals, humans can kill one another. You may as well say that, because humans are capable of eating plants, then humans are also capable of eating animals. After all, both plants and animals are living things, right? It is theoretically possible (even if you personally consider it to be highly implausible), that those who are not psychological fazed by the murder/death of an animal would also not be psychologically fazed by the murder/death of a human, for the same basic reasons. Of course it's possible, but it's far from being the only conclusion one could draw from the given premise. Are you saying that it is very different because the humans being killed have a superego, while non-human creatures do not? Or is your claim that the person doing the killing has a superego and thus will recognize that the human they are killing has one as well? My theory is that the latter is the case, but that is neither here nor there. I was trying to demonstrate the possibility that your conclusion did not necessarily follow from your premise.

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:58 am

There is some vague credence to his argument; however, I feel that, since animals are generally seen, from a cultural perspective, quite unlike humans, you're not going to find these behaviors coinciding anywhere. You don't kill your own kind, right? In fact, you could say that those who regard animals at the level of humans are more likely to commit murder on humans if they kill animals. Jeffery Dohmer is a good example of this. As a child he killed his pets, animals I'm sure he identified with, as he was very lonely... ...this is all theory of course, and I'm not about to back it up. Especially since I stayed up all night and am typing this with very little thought.

by **ThePeccary** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 5:34 am

In fact, you could say that those who regard animals at the level of humans are more likely to commit murder on humans if they kill animals. I thought the same thing. It seems to me that people who think that human beings are apes have a low opinion of humanity. Perhaps meat-eaters who see human beings as being somehow 'above' the animals they eat have an over-inflated sense of human importance. Either way, the meat eater is going to be less inclined to kill a human being than the vegetarian.

by **orbitz** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 9:04 am

That's a bit of a stretch. You assume that we're lowering our feelings about humans when we become veggie. If we did that, we'd just eat anything, we wouldn't stop eating all animals. We're raising our feelings about non-human animals to the human level, where we acknowledge their right to exist.

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 3:47 pm

orbitz, his logic is using vegetarians that kill animals... which a vegetarian wouldn't do, of course. Meat eaters clearly do feel above that which they eat. And I don't see anything wrong with that... I have a few vegetarian friends, and even though they have big mouths, they wouldn't hurt a fly. Actually, neither would I. I've perfected catching flies in my hand and releasing. [img]/wwwthreads/images/icons/smile.gif[/img]

by **orbitz** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:30 pm

What are you talking about?? I never said anything about vegetarians who kill animals.

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:30 pm

Meat eaters clearly do feel above that which they eat. And I don't see anything wrong with that... Would that be the only hierarchy you don't see anything wrong with, or are there others?

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:38 pm

raindog, hierarchy exists in nature naturally.

by **Kevehs** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:43 pm

[color=green] I was trying to demonstrate the possibility that your conclusion did not necessarily follow from your premise. Something which I totally agree with. My theory was based on drawing out a possibility for the purposes of the above discussion, and it need not have been plausible. If anything I said lead you to believe that I was proposing that as a definitive answer, then I apologize. [color=green] I thought the same thing. It seems to me that people who think that human beings are apes have a low opinion of humanity. I only think so because we are scientifically defined as such. The word ape generally refers to a member of the Primate order. In particular, we fall under the Anthropoidea suborder, the Catarrhini infraorder, the Hominoidea superfamily, the Hominidae family, and finally into the Homininae subfamily genus of Homo, which stands beside the genus of Gorilla and Pan (chimps, bonobos). You can find this information on any primate taxonomy written since DNA evidence hit the scene, and to suggest otherwise is to literally change the meaning of the word “ape.” There are cases when “ape” is meant to specifically refer to the Hylobatidae or Hominidae orders (sometimes called the “higher primates”), but then again human beings are definitely apes. I happen to also believe that we are not inherently “better” than non-human primates, or any other creature, but that is not directly related to my reasoning for considering human beings to be apes. However, the word “monkey” generally does not refer to humans, so perhaps you meant that instead. [color=green] Either way, the meat eater is going to be less inclined to kill a human being than the vegetarian. This is not even remotely true. Again, you assume that the vegetarian must devalue the human being when they refuse to kill animals for moral reasons. This may be the case with some, and they may or may not be more likely to kill a human being than the average meat eater for that reason (there are a number of other more important factors to consider). However, a great number of the vegetarians I have met neither raise nor lower the value of animals in relation to themselves. Rather, they consider the animals to have some value outside of their relation to human beings. As such, there is no reason at all to conclude that these vegetarians (the vast majority in my opinion), would be more likely to kill a human being than the average meat eater. You misunderstood my above example to Svo, as it had absolutely nothing to do with the value placed in the creature selected for death (as should be obvious from the fact that the egoist would not kill the human if they valued them sufficiently), but rather the experience of watching an animate creature die (something which I wrongly assumed that meat eater would be somewhat more likely to have experience with). If there are those vegetarians who do change the values involved in relation to themselves, raising the value of an animal in relation to a human being does not in any way suggest that the human value is correspondingly lowered (unless you are suggesting that the value of animals is objectively lower than humans as a matter of fact, something you would need to demonstrate). Again, I have no doubt that some vegetarians might do that, but this definitely does not warrant the general claim, “Either way, the meat eater is going to be less inclined to kill a human being than the vegetarian.,” as there are sufficient counter-examples. Pec, I really do appreciate your presence on these forums, though I suppose you must at times not realize that. Still, I think I’m going to name the kind of logic you have demonstrated above a “Peccarism” in honor of all the wonderful arguments you tend to offer. [img]/wwwthreads/images/icons/wink.gif[/img]

by **Kevehs** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:54 pm

[color=green] raindog, hierarchy exists in nature naturally. I'm sorry, I know I'm not supposed to be feeding the troll, but I just had to repost that sentence for all to admire the beauty!

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:55 pm

Oh, orbitz, I said: In fact, you could say that those who regard animals at the level of humans are more likely to commit murder on humans if they kill animals. And ThePeccery agreed with me.

by **Guest** » Sun Apr 21, 2002 4:57 pm

Main Entry: na·ture Pronunciation: 'nA-ch&r Function: noun Etymology: Middle English, from Middle French, from Latin natura, from natus, past participle of nasci to be born -- more at NATION Date: 14th century 1 a : the inherent character or basic constitution of a person or thing : ESSENCE b : DISPOSITION, TEMPERAMENT 2 a : a creative and controlling force in the universe b : an inner force or the sum of such forces in an individual 3 : a kind or class usually distinguished by fundamental or essential characteristics <documents of a confidential nature> <acts of a ceremonial nature> 4 : the physical constitution or drives of an organism; especially : an excretory organ or function -- used in phrases like the call of nature 5 : a spontaneous attitude (as of generosity) 6 : the external world in its entirety 7 a : humankind's original or natural condition b : a simplified mode of life resembling this condition 8 : the genetically controlled qualities of an organism 9 : natural scenery It's okay, we all know interpreting intent in someones words is difficult for idiots.

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