Section F - Is "anarcho"-capitalism a type of anarchism?

F.1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?
	F.1.1 Why is the failure to renounce hierarchy the Achilles Heel 
 	      of right-wing libertarianism and "anarcho"-capitalism? 
	F.1.2 How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?
	F.1.3 Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?

F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by "freedom?"
	F.2.1 What are the implications of defining liberty in  
	      terms of (property) rights?
	F.2.2 How does private property affect freedom?
	F.2.3 Can "anarcho"-capitalist theory justify the state?
	F.2.4 But surely transactions on the market are voluntary?
	F.2.5 But surely circumstances are the result of liberty  
	      and so cannot be objected to?
	F.2.6 Do Libertarian-capitalists support slavery?
	F.2.7 But surely abolishing capitalism would restrict liberty?
	F.2.8 Why should we reject the "anarcho"-capitalist definitions 
	      of freedom and justice?

F.3 Why do "anarcho"-capitalists generally place little or no value 
    on "equality," and what do they mean by that term?
	F.3.1 Why is this disregard for equality important?
	F.3.2 But what about "anarcho"-capitalist support for charity?

F.4 What is the right-libertarian position on private property?
	F.4.1 What is wrong with a "homesteading" theory of property?
	F.4.2 Why is the "Lockean Proviso" important?
	F.4.3 How does private property affect individualism?
	F.4.4 How does private property affect relationships?
	F.4.5 Does private property co-ordinate without hierarchy?

F.5 Will privatising "the commons" increase liberty?

F.6 Is "anarcho" capitalism against the state?
	F.6.1 What's wrong with this "free market" justice?
 	F.6.2 What are the social consequences of such a system?
 	F.6.3 But surely Market Forces will stop abuse by the rich?
 	F.6.4 Why are these "defence associations" states?
 	F.6.5 What other effects would "free market" justice have?

F.7 What is the myth of "Natural Law"?
	F.7.1 Why "Natural Law" in the first place?
 	F.7.2 But "Natural Law" provides protection for individual 
 	      rights from violation by the State. Those against 
 	      Natural Law desire total rule by the state.
 	F.7.3 Why is "Natural Law" authoritarian?
	F.7.4 Does "Natural Law" actually provides protection for 
	      individual liberty?
 	F.7.5 But Natural Law was discovered, not invented!
	F.7.6 Why is the notion of "discovery" contradictory?

F.8 What role did the state take in the creation of capitalism?
	F.8.1 What social forces lay behind the rise of capitalism?
 	F.8.2 What was the social context of the statement "laissez-faire"?
 	F.8.3 What other forms did state intervention in creating 
 	      capitalism take?
	F.8.4 Aren't the enclosures a socialist myth?
	F.8.5 What about the lack of enclosures in the Americas?
 	F.8.6 How did working people view the rise of capitalism?
	F.8.7 Why is the history of capitalism important?

F.9 Is Medieval Iceland an example of "anarcho"-capitalism working in 
    practice?

F.10 Would laissez-faire capitalism be stable?
	F.10.1 Would privatising banking make capitalism stable?
	F.10.2 How does the labour market effect capitalism?
	F.10.3 Was laissez-faire capitalism stable?

Section F - Is "anarcho"-capitalism a type of anarchism?

Anyone who has followed political discussion on the net has probably come
across people calling themselves libertarians but arguing from a right-wing,
pro-capitalist perspective. For most Europeans this is weird, as in Europe
the term "libertarian" is almost always used in conjunction with "socialist" 
or "communist." In the US, though, the Right has partially succeeded in
appropriating this term for itself. Even stranger, however, is that a few of 
these right-wingers have started calling themselves "anarchists" in what 
must be one of the finest examples of an oxymoron in the English language: 
'Anarcho-capitalist'!!

Arguing with fools is seldom rewarded, but to allow their foolishness to go
unchallenged risks allowing them to deceive those who are new to anarchism.
That's what this section of the anarchist FAQ is for, to show why the claims
of these "anarchist" capitalists are false. Anarchism has always been
anti-capitalist and any "anarchism" that claims otherwise cannot be part 
of the anarchist tradition. So this section of the FAQ does not reflect 
some kind of debate within anarchism, as many of these types like to pretend, 
but a debate between anarchism and its old enemy, capitalism. In many ways 
this debate mirrors the one between Peter Kropotkin and Herbert Spencer, an
English pro-capitalist, minimal statist, at the turn the 19th century
and, as such, it is hardly new.

The "anarcho"-capitalist argument hinges on using the dictionary definition 
of "anarchism" and/or "anarchy" - they try to define anarchism as being
"opposition to government," and nothing else. However, dictionaries are
hardly politically sophisticated and their definitions rarely reflect the
wide range of ideas associated with political theories and their history.
Thus the dictionary "definition" is anarchism will tend to ignore its 
consistent views on property, exploitation, property and capitalism (ideas
easily discovered if actual anarchist texts are read). And, of course, many 
dictionaries "define" anarchy as "chaos" or "disorder" but we never see 
"anarcho"-capitalists use that particular definition!

And for this strategy to work, a lot of "inconvenient" history and ideas 
from all branches of anarchism must be ignored. From individualists 
like Spooner and Tucker to communists like Kropotkin and Malatesta, 
anarchists have always been anti-capitalist (see section G for more on 
the anti-capitalist nature of individualist anarchism). Therefore 
"anarcho"-capitalists are not anarchists in the same sense that 
rain is not dry.

Of course, we cannot stop the "anarcho"-capitalists using the words
"anarcho", "anarchism" and "anarchy" to describe their ideas. The
democracies of the west could not stop the Chinese Stalinist state calling 
itself the People's Republic of China. Nor could the social democrats
stop the fascists in Germany calling themselves "National Socialists".
Nor could the Italian anarcho-syndicalists stop the fascists using the
expression "National Syndicalism". This does not mean that any of these
movements actual name reflected their content -- China is a dictatorship,
not a democracy, the Nazi's were not socialists (capitalists made fortunes
in Nazi Germany because it crushed the labour movement), and the Italian 
fascist state had nothing in common with anarcho-syndicalists ideas of
decentralised, "from the bottom up" unions and the abolition of the
state and capitalism. 

Therefore, just because someone uses a label it does not mean that they
support the ideas associated with that label. And this is the case with 
"anarcho"-capitalism -- its ideas are at odds with the key ideas associated
with all forms of traditional anarchism (even individualist anarchism
which is often claimed as being a forefather of the ideology).

All we can do is indicate *why* "anarcho"-capitalism is not part of the
anarchist tradition and so has falsely appropriated the name. This section
of the FAQ aims to do just that -- present the case why "anarcho"-capitalists
are not anarchists. We do this, in part, by indicating where they differ
from genuine anarchists (on such essential issues as private property, 
equality, exploitation and opposition to hierarchy) In addition, we take 
the opportunity to present a general critique of right-libertarian claims 
from an anarchist perspective. In this way we show up why anarchists reject 
that theory as being opposed to liberty and anarchist ideals.

We are covering this topic in an anarchist FAQ for only one reason -- the
high number of "libertarian" and "anarcho"-capitalists on the net (likely 
a class-based phenomenon, based on ownership of computers!) As we
have extensively documented in earlier sections, anarchist theory has
always been anti-capitalist. There is no relationship between anarchism
and capitalism, in any form. Therefore, there is a need for this section
in order to indicate exactly why "anarcho"-capitalism is not anarchist.
We have, in earlier sections (see section B in particular), indicated why 
the idea of a "libertarian" capitalism is itself nonsense and will not 
repeat ourselves here.

So this section of the FAQ does not, as we noted above, represent some kind
of "debate" within anarchism. It reflects the attempt by anarchists to 
reclaim the history and meaning of anarchism from those who are attempting
to steal its name (just as right-wingers in America have attempted to
appropriate the name "libertarian" for their pro-capitalist views, and by
so doing ignore over 100 years of anti-capitalist usage). However, this
section also serves two other purposes. Firstly, critiquing right-libertarian
and "anarcho"-capitalist theories allows us to explain anarchist ones at
the same time and indicate why they are better. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the "ideas" and "ideals" that underlie "anarcho"-capitalism
are usually identical (or, at the very least, similar) to those of 
neo-liberalism (as Bob Black points outs, a "wing of the Reaganist Right 
has obviously appropriated, with suspect selectivity, such libertarian 
themes as deregulation and voluntarism. Ideologues indignant that Reagan 
has travestied their principles. Tough shit! I notice that it's their
principles, not mine, that he found suitable to travesty" [_The Libertarian
As Conservative_]). And as neo-liberalism is being used as the ideological
basis of the current attack on the working class, critiquing "anarcho"
capitalism and right-libertarianism also allows use to build theoretical
weapons to use to resist this attack and aid the class struggle.

A few more points before beginning. When debating with "libertarian" 
or "anarchist" capitalists it's necessary to remember that while they 
claim "real capitalism" does not exist (because all existing forms of 
capitalism are statist), they will claim that all the good things we 
have -- advanced medical technology, consumer choice of products, etc. 
-- are nevertheless due to "capitalism." Yet if you point out any problems 
in modern life, these will be blamed on "statism." Since there has never 
been and never will be a capitalist system without some sort of state, 
it's hard to argue against this "logic." Many actually use the example 
of the Internet as proof of the power of "capitalism," ignoring the 
fact that the state paid for its development before turning it over 
to companies to make a profit from it. Similar points can be made 
about numerous other products of "capitalism" and the world we live
in. To artificially separate one aspect of a complex evolution fails
to understand the nature and history of the capitalist system.

In addition to this ability to be selective about the history and 
results of capitalism, their theory has a great "escape clause." If 
wealthy employers abuse their power or the rights of the working class
(as they have always done), then they have (according to "libertarian"
ideology) ceased to be capitalists! This is based upon the misperception 
that an economic system that relies on force *cannot* be capitalistic. 
This is *very* handy as it can absolve the ideology from blame for any 
(excessive) oppression which results from its practice. Thus individuals
are always to blame, *not* the system that generated the opportunities for
abuse they freely used.

Anarchism has always been aware of the existence of "free market"
capitalism, particularly its extreme (minimal statist) wing, and has
always rejected it. For example, Proudhon noted that "the disciples of
Malthus and of Say, who oppose with all their might any intervention of
the State in matters commercial or industrial, do not fail to avail 
themselves of this seemingly liberal attitude, and to show themselves 
more revolutionary than the Revolution. More than one honest searcher
has been deceived thereby." However, this apparent "libertarian" attitude
of supporters of capitalism is false as pure free market capitalism 
cannot solve the social question, which arises because of capitalism
itself. Thus "this inaction of Power in economic matters [celebrated 
by the "free market" right] was the foundation of government. What 
need should we have of a political organisation, if Power once 
permitted us to enjoy economic order?" [_The General Idea of the 
Revolution_, p. 226] Instead of capitalism, Proudhon advocated the 
"constitution of Value," the "organisation of credit," the elimination 
of interest, the "establishment of workingmen's associations" and 
"the use of a just price." [Ibid., p. 233]

Thus anarchists have evaluated "free market" capitalism and rejected it
as non-anarchist over 150 years ago. Attempts by "anarcho"-capitalism to
say that their system is "anarchist" flies in the face of this long 
history of anarchist analysis.

More generally, we must stress that most (if not all) anarchists do not 
want to live in a society *just like this one* but without state coercion 
and (the initiation of) force. Anarchists do not confuse "freedom" with 
the "right" to govern and exploit others nor with being able to change 
masters. It is not enough to say we can start our own (co-operative) 
business in such a society. We want the abolition of the capitalist 
system of authoritarian relationships, not just a change of bosses 
or the possibility of little islands of liberty within a sea of 
capitalism (islands which are always in danger of being flooded 
and our activity destroyed). Thus, in this section of the FAQ, 
we analysis many "anarcho"-capitalist claims on their own terms 
(for example, the importance of equality in the market or why
capitalism cannot be reformed away by exchanges on the capitalist 
market) but that does not mean we desire a society nearly identical 
to the current one. Far from it, we want to transform this society 
into one more suited for developing and enriching individuality and
freedom. But before we can achieve that we must critically evaluate
the current society and point out its basic limitations.

Finally, we dedicate this section of the FAQ to those who have seen the 
real face of "free market" capitalism at work: the working men and women 
(anarchist or not) murdered in the jails and concentration camps or on the 
streets by the hired assassins of capitalism. 

F.1 Are "anarcho"-capitalists really anarchists?

In a word, no. While "anarcho"-capitalists obviously try to associate
themselves with the anarchist tradition by using the word "anarcho",
their ideas are distinctly at odds with those associated with anarchism.
Because of this any claims that their ideas are anarchist or that they
are part of the anarchist tradition or movement are false.

"Anarcho"-capitalists claim to be anarchists because they say that they 
oppose government. As such, as noted in the last section, they use 
a dictionary definition of anarchism. However, this fails to appreciate
that anarchism is a *political theory*, not a dictionary definition. 
As dictionaries are rarely politically sophisticated things, this means 
that they fail to recognise that anarchism is more than just opposition to
government, it is also marked a opposition to capitalism (i.e. exploitation
and private property). Thus, opposition to government is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for being an anarchist -- you also need 
to be opposed to exploitation and capitalist private property. As 
"anarcho"-capitalists do not consider interest, rent and profits (i.e.
capitalism) to be exploitative nor oppose capitalist property rights,
they are not anarchists.

So in what ways do "anarcho"-capitalists differ from anarchists? There 
are three main ones:

Firstly, unlike both Individualist and Social anarchists,
"anarcho"-capitalists support capitalism (a "pure" free market type 
of capitalism). This means that they reject totally the ideas of anarchists 
with regards to property and economic analysis. For example, like all
supporters of capitalists they consider rent, profit and interest as
valid incomes. In contrast, all Anarchists consider these as exploitation
and agree with the Individualist Anarchist Tucker when argued that
"*[w]hoever* contributes to production is alone entitled. *What* has no
rights that *who* is bound to respect. *What* is a thing. *Who* is a person.
Things have no claims; they exist only to be claimed. The possession of
a right cannot be predicted of dead material, but only a living person."
[quoted by Wm. Gary Kline, _The Individualist Anarchists_, p. 73] (And this,
we must note, is the fundamental critique of the capitalist theory that 
capital is productive. In and of themselves, fixed costs do not create
value. Rather value is creation depends on how investments are developed
and used once in place. Because of this the Individualist Anarchists 
considered non-labour derived income as usury, unlike "anarcho"-capitalists).

Similarly, anarchists reject the notion of capitalist property rights in
favour of possession (including the full fruits of one's labour). For 
example, anarchists reject private ownership of land in favour of a 
"occupancy and use" regime. In this we follow Proudhon's _What is 
Property?_ and argue that "property is theft".

As these ideas are an *essential* part of anarchist politics, they cannot
be removed without seriously damaging the rest of the theory. This can
be seen from Tucker's comments that "*Liberty* insists. . . [on] the abolition 
of the State and the abolition of usury; on no more government of man by 
man, and no more exploitation of man by man." [cited by Eunice Schuster in 
_Native American Anarchism_, p. 140]. He indicates that anarchism has 
specific economic *and* political ideas, that it opposes capitalism along
with the state. Therefore anarchism was never purely a "political" concept, 
but always combined an opposition to oppression with an opposition to 
exploitation. The social anarchists made exactly the same point.  Which 
means that when Tucker argued that "*Liberty* insists on Socialism. . . - 
true Socialism, Anarchistic Socialism: the prevalence on earth of Liberty, 
Equality, and Solidarity" [_Instead of a Book_, p. 363] he knew exactly 
what he was saying and meant it whole heartedly.

This combination of the political and economic is essential as they mutually
reinforce each other. Without the economic ideas, the political ideas 
would be meaningless as inequality would make a mockery of them. As Kline
notes, the Individualist Anarchists' "proposals were designed to establish
true equality of opportunity . . . and they expected this would result in
a society without great wealth or poverty. In the absence of monopolistic
factors which would distort competition, they expected a society largely
of self-employed workmen with no significant disparity of wealth between
any of them since all would be required to live at their own expense and 
not at the expense of exploited fellow human beings." [Op. Cit., pp. 103-4]

By removing the underlying commitment to abolish non-labour income, any
"anarchist" capitalist society would have vast differences in wealth
and so power. Instead of a government imposed monopolies in land, money
and so on, the economic power flowing from private property and capital 
would ensure that the majority remained in (to use Spooner's words) "the 
condition of servants" (see sections F.2 and F.3.1 for more on this). 
The Individualist Anarchists were aware of this danger and so supported
economic ideas that opposed usury (i.e. rent, profit and interest) and
ensured the worker the full value of her labour. While not all of them
called these ideas "socialist" it is clear that these ideas *are* socialist
in nature and in aim (similarly, not all the Individualist Anarchists
called themselves anarchists but their ideas are clearly anarchist in
nature and in aim).

Because "anarcho"-capitalists embrace capitalism and reject socialism, 
they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.

Which brings us nicely to the second point, namely a lack of concern for
equality. In stark contrast to anarchists of all schools, inequality
is not seen to be a problem with "anarcho"-capitalists (see section F.3). 
However, it is a truism that not all "traders" are equally subject to the 
market (i.e. have the same market power). In many cases, a few have 
sufficient control of resources to influence or determine price and in 
such cases, all others must submit to those terms or not buy the commodity. 
When the commodity is labour power, even this option is lacking -- workers 
have to accept a job in order to live. As we argue in section F.10.2, 
workers are usually at a disadvantage on the labour market when compared 
to capitalists, and this forces them to sell their liberty in return for 
making profits for others. These profits increase inequality in society
as the property owners receive the surplus value their workers produce. 
This increases inequality further, consolidating market power and so weakens
the bargaining position of workers further, ensuring that even the freest
competition possible could not eliminate class power and society (something 
B. Tucker recognised as occurring with the development of trusts within 
capitalism -- see section G.4). Little wonder Proudhon argued that the
law of supply and demand was a "deceitful law . . . suitable only for
assuring the victory of the strong over the weak, of those who own 
property over those who own nothing." [quoted by Alan Ritter, _The 
Political Thought of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon_, p. 121]

Wage labour is a key way of creating, maintaining and increasing 
inequality (as well as being a source of domination and subordination, 
i.e. unfreedom). Needless to say, inequalities of power and wealth do 
not restrict themselves solely to workplaces nor is the damage of hierarchy 
upon individuals and their liberty limited to working hours. Both have a 
deep impact on the rest of society, expanding into *all* areas of life 
and restricting liberty everywhere (see section F.3 for a further 
discussion on this). You cannot isolate one aspect of life (i.e. work)
and believe that it will somehow not affect all others. However, the 
"anarcho"-capitalist seems to believe you can. 

Therefore anarchists recognise that "free exchange" in unequal circumstances 
will increase inequality between individuals and classes, *not* reduce it 
(and that inequality will produce social relationships which are based on 
hierarchy and domination, *not* freedom). As Noam Chomsky put it:

"Anarcho-capitalism, in my opinion, is a doctrinal system which, if ever
implemented, would lead to forms of tyranny and oppression that have few
counterparts in human history. There isn't the slightest possibility that
its (in my view, horrendous) ideas would be implemented, because they would
quickly destroy any society that made this colossal error. The idea of 'free
contract' between the potentate and his starving subject is a sick joke,
perhaps worth some moments in an academic seminar exploring the consequences
of (in my view, absurd) ideas, but nowhere else." [_Noam Chomsky on 
Anarchism_, interview with Tom Lane, December 23, 1996]

Because of the evil effects of inequality on freedom, both the social 
and individualist anarchists desired to create an environment in which 
circumstances would not drive people to sell their liberty to others 
in return for wages. In other words, they desired an equalisation of 
market power by opposing interest, rent and profit and capitalist 
definitions of private property. Kline summarises this by saying "the 
American [individualist] anarchists exposed the tension existing in 
liberal thought between private property and the ideal of equal access. 
The Individual Anarchists were, at least, aware that existing conditions 
were far from ideal, that the system itself working against the majority 
of individuals in their efforts to attain its promises. Lack of capital, 
the means to creation and accumulation of wealth, usually doomed a 
labourer to a life of exploitation. This the anarchists knew and they 
abhorred such a system." [Op. Cit., p. 102]

And this desire for bargaining equality is reflected in their economic 
ideas and by removing these underlying economic ideas of the individualist
anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalism makes a mockery of any ideas they 
do appropriate. Essentially, the Individualist Anarchists agreed with
Rousseau that in order to prevent extreme inequality of fortunes you 
deprive people of the means to accumulate in the first place and 
*not* take away wealth from the rich. An important point which 
"anarcho"-capitalism fails to understand or appreciate.

In addition, we must note that such inequalities in power and wealth 
will need  "defending" from those subject to them ("anarcho"-capitalists 
recognise the need for private police and courts to defend property 
from theft -- and, anarchists add, to defend the theft and despotism 
associated with property!). Due to its support of private property (and 
thus authority), "anarcho"-capitalism ends up retaining a state in its 
"anarchy"; namely a *private* state whose existence its proponents 
attempt to deny simply by refusing to call it a state, like an 
ostrich hiding its head in the sand (see section F.6 for more 
on this and why "anarcho"-capitalism is better described as 
"private state" capitalism). 

For anarchists, this need of capitalism for some kind of state is 
unsurprising because:

"Anarchy without socialism seems equally as impossible to us [as socialism 
without anarchy], for in such a case it could not be other than the 
domination of the strongest, and would therefore set in motion right 
away the organisation and consolidation of this domination; that is 
to the constitution of government." [Errico Malatesta, _Life and Ideas_, 
p. 148]

Because of this, the "anarcho"-capitalist rejection of anarchist ideas on 
capitalist property economics and the need for equality, they cannot be 
considered anarchists or part of the anarchist tradition.

Thirdly, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists consider a society 
of generalised wage labour as a free and non-exploitative one -- but 
such a society is opposed by anarchists. Like all socialists, anarchists 
desire to see workers reunited with the means of production they use and 
so end the exploitation of workers by capitalists and landlords. In other 
words, when the Individual anarchists called themselves "socialists" they 
meant it (see section G for more details on this)! 

If we look at the work of Individualist Anarchist Lysander Spooner, we 
find that he considered capitalism to result in labourers becoming "mere 
tools and machines in the hands of their employers" and labour "only 
for the benefit of their employers." [_A Letter to Grover Cleveland_, 
p. 50] He considered the Money Monopoly (a combination of specie commodity
money and a 10% tax on non-registered banks) as "the one great obstacle
to the liberation of the labouring classes all over the world", a monopoly
created by "the employers of wage labour" to ensure necessity "compel[led]
them [the great body of wealth producers] . . . - by the alternative of
starvation - to sell their labour to the money monopolists." [Op. Cit., 
p. 49, p. 48, p. 20]

Such an analysis is essentially socialist in nature, recognising that 
apparently "free" markets create conditions which drive working class
people to sell their liberty on the market. Similarly, his vision of a
free society is also socialist, with wage labour no more. With the end 
of the money (and land) monopolies, he considered that "with few or no 
exceptions" working people would stop being wage slaves and become 
self-employed workers. In stark contrast to wage labour, he considered 
that free labour involved the worker "appl[ying] both his . . . head and 
his hands" [Op. Cit., p. 48, p. 50]. Thus Spooner recognised that under 
wage labour, there is a division of labour, with a few using their heads
(giving orders) and the many using their hands (following orders). 

"Committed as they were to equality in the pursuit of property," argues
Kline, "the objective for the anarchist became the construction of a
society providing equal access to those things necessary for creating
wealth. The goal of the anarchists who extolled mutualism and the
abolition of all monopolies was, then, a society where everyone willing
to work would have the tools and raw materials necessary for production
in a non-exploitative system . . .the dominant vision of the future 
society . . . [was] underpinned by individual, self-employed workers."
[Op. Cit., p. 95]

"Anarcho"-capitalists assume that generalised wage labour would remain
under their system (while paying lip-service to the possibilities of 
co-operatives -- and if an "anarcho"-capitalist thinks that co-operative
will become the dominant form of workplace organisation, then they are
some kind of market socialist, *not* a capitalist). It is clear that their 
end point (a pure capitalism, i.e. generalised wage labour) is directly 
the opposite of that desired by anarchists. This was the case of the 
Individualist Anarchists who embraced the ideal of (non-capitalist) 
laissez faire competition -- they did so, as noted, to *end* wage 
labour and usury, *not* to maintain them (indeed, their analysis of the 
change in American society from one of mainly independent producers into 
one based mainly upon wage labour has many parallels with, of all people, 
Karl Marx's presented in chapter 33 of _Capital_).

"Anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, believe that it is likely that 
workplaces will remain hierarchical (i.e. capitalistic) even if the 
public state has been dissolved and that this is of no concern. This 
belief reveals the priority of their values: "efficiency" (the bottom 
line) is considered more important than eliminating the domination, 
coercion, and exploitation of workers. Similarly, they consider that
profits, interest and rent as valid sources of income while anarchists
oppose these as usury and exploitative.

Moreover, in practice, wage labour is a major source of oppression 
and authoritarianism within society -- there is little or no freedom 
within capitalist production (as Bakunin noted, "the worker sells his
person and his liberty for a given time"). So, in stark contrast to 
anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists have no problem with factory fascism 
(i.e. wage labour), a position which seems highly illogical for a theory
calling itself libertarian. If it were truly libertarian, it would 
oppose all forms of domination, not just statism. This position flows 
from the "anarcho"-capitalist definition of freedom as the absence of 
coercion and will be discussed in section F.2 in more detail.

This whole-hearted support for wage labour and capitalist
property rights indicates that "anarcho"-capitalists are 
not anarchists because they do not reject all forms of 
*archy.* They obviously support the hierarchy between 
boss and worker (wage labour) and landlord and tenant. 
Anarchism, by definition, is against all forms of archy, 
including the hierarchy generated by capitalist property. 
To ignore the obvious archy associated with capitalist 
property is highly illogical.

The anti-anarchist nature of "anarcho"-capitalism can best
be seen by quoting a leading "anarcho"-capitalist, Murray
Rothbard. He argues, that the state "arrogates to itself a 
monopoly of force, of ultimate decision-making power, over a 
given area territorial area." [Rothbard, _The Ethics of Liberty_, 
p. 170] In and of itself, this definition is unremarkable. 
Unfortunately for him (and "anarcho"-capitalist claims of
being anarchist), he also notes that capitalist property owners 
have similar powers. As he states, "[o]bviously, in a free 
society, Smith has the ultimate decision-making power over 
his own just property, Jones over his, etc." [Op. Cit., p. 173] 
and, equally obviously, this ultimate-decision making power 
extends to those who *use,* but do not own, such property
(i.e. tenants and workers). The statist nature of property
property is clearly indicated by Rothbard's words -- the
property owner in an "anarcho"-capitalist society possesses
the "ultimate decision-making power" over a given area, which
is also what the state has currently. 

As we argue in more depth in section F.2, "anarcho"-capitalism
cannot be considered as anarchist simply because they replace
the authority of the state with that of the property owner. Both
has "ultimate decision making power" over a given area and so over 
those who live in (or use) that area. The similarities between 
capitalism and statism are clear -- and so why "anarcho"-capitalism
cannot be anarchist. To reject the authority (the "ultimate 
decision-making power") of the state and embrace that of the 
property owner indicates not only a highly illogical stance but 
one at odds with the basic principles of anarchism.

Thus anarchism is far more than the common dictionary definition
of "no government" -- it also entails being against all forms of
*archy*, including those generated by capitalist property. This 
is clear from the roots of the word "anarchy." As we noted 
in section A.1, the word anarchy means "no rulers" or "contrary 
to authority." As Rothbard himself acknowledges, the property 
owner is the ruler of their property and, therefore, those who 
use it (hence Bakunin's above quoted comment that "the 
worker sells his person and his liberty for a given time").
For this reason "anarcho"-capitalism cannot be considered as
a form of anarchism -- a real anarchist must logically oppose 
the authority of the property owner along with that of the state.

Because "anarcho"-capitalism does not explicitly (or implicitly, for 
that matter) call for economic arrangements that will end wage labour 
and usury they cannot be considered anarchists or part of the anarchist 
tradition.

To conclude. 

Political theories should be identified by their actual features and 
history rather than labels. Once we recognise that, we soon find out that 
"anarcho"-capitalism is an oxymoron. Anarchists and "anarcho"-capitalists 
are not part of the same movement or tradition. Their ideas and aims 
are in direct opposition to those of all kinds of anarchists. 

While anarchists have always opposed capitalism, "anarcho"-capitalists 
have embraced it. And due to this embrace their "anarchy" will be marked 
by extensive differences in wealth and power, differences that will show 
themselves up in relationships based upon subordination and hierarchy 
(such as wage labour), *not* freedom (little wonder that Proudhon 
argued that "property is despotism" -- it creates authoritarian and
hierarchical relationships between people in a similar way to statism).

Their support for "free market" capitalism ignores the impact of wealth 
and power on the nature and outcome of individual decisions within the 
market (see sections F.2 and F.3 for further discussion). For example, 
as we indicate in sections J.5.10, J.5.11 and J.5.12, wage labour is less 
efficient than self-management in production but due to the structure and 
dynamics of the capitalist market, "market forces" will actively discourage 
self-management due to its empowering nature for workers. In other words,
a developed capitalist market will promote hierarchy and unfreedom in 
production in spite of its effects on individual workers and their 
wants (see also section F.10.2). Thus "free market" capitalism tends 
to re-enforce inequalities of wealth and power, *not* eliminate them.

Furthermore, any such system of (economic and social) power will require 
extensive force to maintain it and the "anarcho"-capitalist system of 
competing "defence firms" will simply be a new state, enforcing 
capitalist power, property rights and law.

Overall, the lack of concern for meaningful freedom within production and 
the effects of vast differences in power and wealth within society as a 
whole makes "anarcho"-capitalism little better than "anarchism for the rich." 
Emma Goldman recognised this when she argued that "'Rugged individualism' 
has meant all the 'individualism' for the masters . . . in whose name
political tyranny and social oppression are defended and held up as 
virtues while every aspiration and attempt of man to gain freedom . . . 
is denounced as . . . evil in the name of that same individualism." 
[ _Red Emma Speaks_, p. 112] And, as such, is no anarchism at all.

So, unlike anarchists, "anarcho"-capitalists do not seek the "abolition
of the proletariat" (to use Proudhon's expression) via changing capitalist 
property rights and institutions. Thus the "anarcho"-capitalist and the 
anarchist have different starting positions and opposite ends in mind 
and so they cannot be considered part of the same (anarchist) tradition.

As we discuss further in later sections, the "anarcho"-capitalist
claims to being anarchists are bogus simply because they reject so much
of the anarchist tradition as to make what they do accept non-anarchist
in theory and practice. Little wonder Peter Marshall said that "few
anarchists would accept the 'anarcho-capitalists' into the anarchist
camp since they do not share a concern for economic equality and
social justice." [_Demanding the Impossible_, p. 565]

F.1.1 Why is the failure to renounce hierarchy the Achilles Heel of 
      right-wing libertarianism and "anarcho"-capitalism? 

Any capitalist system will produce vast differences in economic (and social)
wealth and power. As we argue in section F.3.1, such differences will
reflect themselves in the market and any "free" contracts agreed there 
will create hierarchical relationships. Thus capitalism is marked by
hierarchy (see section B.1.2) and, unsurprisingly, right-libertarians
and "anarcho"-capitalists fail to oppose such "free market" generated
hierarchy.

Both groups approve of it in the capitalist workplace or rented accommodation 
and the right-Libertarians also approve of it in a 'minimal' state to protect 
private property ("anarcho"-capitalists, in contrast, approve of the use
of private defence firms to protect property). But the failure of these 
two movements to renounce hierarchy is their weakest point. For 
anti-authoritarianism has sunk deep roots into the modern psyche, 
as a legacy of the sixties.

Many people who do not even know what anarchism is have been profoundly
affected by the personal liberation and counterculture movements of the
past thirty years, epitomised by the popular bumper sticker, "Question
Authority." As a result, society now tolerates much more choice than ever
before in matters of religion, sexuality, art, music, clothing, and other
components of lifestyle. We need only recall the conservatism that reigned
in such areas during the fifties to see that the idea of liberty has made
tremendous advances in just a few decades.

Although this liberatory impulse has so far been confined almost entirely
to the personal and cultural realms, it may yet be capable of spilling
over and affecting economic and political institutions, provided it
continues to grow. The Right is well aware of this, as seen in its ongoing
campaigns for "family values," school prayer, suppression of women's
rights, fundamentalist Christianity, sexual abstinence before marriage,
and other attempts to revive the Ozzie-and-Harriet mindset of the Good Old
Days. This is where the efforts of "cultural anarchists" -- artists,
musicians, poets, and others -- are important in keeping alive the ideal
of personal freedom and resistance to authority as a necessary foundation
for economic and political restructuring.

Indeed, the libertarian right (as a whole) support restrictions on freedom
*as long as its not the state that is doing it*! Their support for
capitalism means that they have no problem with bosses dictating what
workers do during working hours (nor outside working hours, if the job
requires employees to take drug tests or not be gay in order to keep it).
If a private landlord or company decrees a mandatory rule or mode of 
living, workers/tenets must "love it or leave it!" Of course, that the
same argument also applies to state laws is one hotly denied by 
right-Libertarians -- a definite case of not seeing the wood for the
trees (see section F.2.3).

Of course, the "anarcho"-capitalist will argue, workers and tenants can
find a more liberal boss or landlord. This, however, ignores two key facts.
Firstly, being able to move to a more liberal state hardly makes state
laws less offensive (as they themselves will be the first to point out).
Secondly, looking for a new job or home is not that easy. Just a moving
to a new state can involve drastic upheavals, so change changing jobs
and homes. Moreover, the job market is usually a buyers market (it has
to be in capitalism, otherwise profits are squeezed -- see sections C.7
and F.10.2) and this means that workers are not usually in a position 
(unless they organise) to demand increased liberties at work. 

It seems somewhat ironic, to say the least, that right-libertarians 
place rights of property over the rights of self-ownership, even though 
(according to their ideology) self-ownership is the foundational right 
from which property rights are derived. Thus in right-libertarianism the 
rights of property owners to discriminate and govern the property-less 
are more important than the freedom from discrimination (i.e. to be 
yourself) or the freedom to govern oneself at all times.

So, when it boils down to it, right-libertarians are not really bothered 
about restrictions on liberty and, indeed, they will defend private 
restrictions on liberty with all their might. This may seem a strange 
position for self-proclaimed "libertarians" to take, but it flows 
naturally from their definition of freedom (see section F.2 for a 
full discussion of this). but by not attacking hierarchy beyond certain 
forms of statism, the 'libertarian' right fundamentally undermines its 
claim to be libertarian. Freedom cannot be compartmentalised, but is 
holistic. The denial of liberty in, say, the workplace, quickly results 
in its being denied elsewhere in society (due to the impact of the
inequalities it would produce) , just as the degrading effects of wage 
labour and the hierarchies with which is it bound up are felt by the worker 
outside work. 

Neither the Libertarian Party nor so-called "anarcho"-capitalism is
*genuinely* anti-authoritarian, as those who are truly dedicated to 
liberty must be. 

F.1.2 How libertarian is right-Libertarian theory?

The short answer is, not very. Liberty not only implies but also requires 
independent, critical thought (indeed, anarchists would argue that critical 
thought requires free development and evolution and that it is precisely
*this* which capitalist hierarchy crushes). For anarchists a libertarian 
theory, if it is to be worthy of the name, must be based upon critical 
thought and reflect the key aspect that characterises life - change and the 
ability to evolve. To hold up dogma and base "theory" upon assumptions (as 
opposed to facts) is the opposite of a libertarian frame of mind. A 
libertarian theory must be based upon reality and recognise the need 
for change and the existence of change. Unfortunately, right-Libertarianism 
is marked more by ideology than critical analysis.

Right-Libertarianism is characterised by a strong tendency of creating
theories based upon assumptions and deductions from these axioms (for a
discussion on the pre-scientific nature of this methodology and of its
dangers, see the next section). Robert Nozick, for example, in _Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia_ makes no attempt to provide a justification of the 
property rights his whole theory is based upon. His main assumption is 
that "[i]ndividuals have rights, and there are certain things no person 
or group may do to them (without violating their rights)." [_Anarchy, 
State and Utopia_, p. ix] While this does have its intuitive appeal, 
it is not much to base a political ideology upon. After all, what rights 
people consider as valid can be pretty subjective and have constantly 
evolved during history. To say that "individuals have rights" is to open up 
the question "what rights?" Indeed, as we argue in greater length in section
F.2, such a rights based system as Nozick desires can and does lead to 
situations developing in which people "consent" to be exploited and 
oppressed and that, intuitively, many people consider supporting the 
"violation" of these "certain rights" (by creating other ones) simply 
because of their evil consequences. 

In other words, starting from the assumption "people have [certain] rights" 
Nozick constructs a theory which, when faced with the reality of unfreedom 
and domination it would create for the many, justifies this unfreedom 
as an expression of liberty. In other words, regardless of the outcome,
the initial assumptions are what matter. Nozick's intuitive rights system 
can lead to some very non-intuitive outcomes.

And does Nozick prove the theory of property rights he assumes? He states 
that "we shall not formulate [it] here." [Op. Cit., p. 150] Moreover, it 
is not formulated anywhere else in his book. And if it is not formulated,
what is there to defend? Surely this means that his Libertarianism is 
without foundations? As Jonathan Wolff notes, Nozick's "Libertarian property 
rights remain substantially undefended." [_Robert Nozick: Property, Justice 
and the Minimal State_, p. 117] Given that the right to acquire property 
is critical to his whole theory you would think it important enough to go 
into in some detail (or at least document). After all, unless he provides us 
with a firm basis for property rights then his entitlement theory is nonsense 
as no one has the right to (private) property.

It could be argued that Nozick *does* present enough information to allow 
us to piece together a possible argument in favour of property rights 
based on his modification of the "Lockean Proviso" (although he does
not point us to these arguments). However, assuming this is the case, 
such a defence actually fails (see section B.3.4 for more on this). If individuals 
*do* have rights, these rights do not include property rights 
in the form Nozick assumes (but does not prove). Nozick appears initially 
convincing because what he assumes with regards to property is a normal 
feature of the society we are in (we would be forgiven when we note here 
that feeble arguments pass for convincing when they are on the same side 
as the prevailing sentiment). 

Similarly, both Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand (who is infamous for repeating 
"A is A" ad infinitum) do the same - base their ideologies on assumptions 
(see section F.7 for more on this). 

Therefore, we see that most of the leading right-Libertarian ideologues 
base themselves on assumptions about what "Man" is or the rights they 
should have (usually in the form that people have (certain) rights because 
they are people). From these theorems and assumptions they build their 
respective ideologies, using logic to deduce the conclusions that their 
assumptions imply. Such a methodology is unscientific and, indeed, a relic 
of religious (pre-scientific) society (see next section) but, more 
importantly, can have negative effects on maximising liberty. This is
because this "methodology" has distinct problems. Murray Bookchin 
argues:

"Conventional reason rests on identity, not change; its fundamental 
principle is that *A equals A,* the famous 'principle of identity,' which 
means that any given phenomenon can be only itself and cannot be other than
what we immediately perceive it to be at a given moment in time. It does not
address the problem of change. A human being is an infant at one time, a
child at another, an adolescent at still another, and finally a youth and
an adult. When we analyse an infant by means of conventional reason, we
are not exploring what it is *becoming* in the process of developing into
a child." ["A Philosophical Naturalism", _Society and Nature_, No.2, p. 64]

In other words, right-Libertarian theory is based upon ignoring the
fundamental aspect of life - namely *change* and *evolution.* Perhaps
it will be argued that identity also accounts for change by including
potentiality -- which means, that we have the strange situation that 
A can *potentially* be A! If A is not actually A, but only has the 
potential to be A, then A is not A. Thus to include change is to 
acknowledge that A does not equal A -- that individuals and humanity 
evolves and so what constitutes A also changes. To maintain identity
and then to deny it seems strange.

That change is far from the "A is A" mentality can be seen from Murray 
Rothbard who goes so far as to state that "one of the notable attributes 
of natural law" is "its applicability to all men [sic!], regardless of 
time or place. Thus ethical law takes its place alongside physical or 
'scientific' natural laws." [_The Ethics of Liberty_, p. 42] Apparently 
the "nature of man" is the only living thing in nature that does not evolve 
or change! Of course, it could be argued that by "natural law" Rothbard is 
only referring to his method of deducing his (and, we stress, they are
just his -- not natural) "ethical laws" -- but his methodology starts
by assuming certain things about "man." Whether these assumptions seem
far or not is besides the point, by using the term "natural law" Rothbard
is arguing that any actions that violate *his* ethical laws are somehow
"against nature" (but if they were against nature, they could not occur 
-- see section F.7 for more on this). Deductions from assumptions is a
Procrustean bed for humanity (as Rothbard's ideology shows).

So, as can be seen, many leading right-Libertarians place great store
by the axiom "A is A" or that "man" has certain rights simply because 
"he" is a "man". And as Bookchin points out, such conventional reason 
"doubtless plays an indispensable role in mathematical thinking and 
mathematical sciences . . . and in the nuts-and-bolts of dealing with 
everyday life" and so is essential to "understand or design mechanical 
entities." [Ibid., p.67] But the question arises, is such reason 
useful when considering people and other forms of life?

Mechanical entities are but one (small) aspect of human life. Unfortunately 
for right-Libertarians (and fortunately for the rest of humanity), human 
beings are *not* mechanical entities but instead are living, breathing, 
feeling, hoping, dreaming, *changing* living organisms. They are not
mechanical entities and any theory that uses reason based on such 
(non-living) entities will flounder when faced with living ones. In 
other words, right-Libertarian theory treats people as the capitalist 
system tries to -- namely as commodities, as things. Instead of human 
beings, whose ideas, ideals and ethics change, develop and grow, capitalism 
and capitalist ideologues try to reduce human life to the level of corn or 
iron (by emphasising the unchanging "nature" of man and their starting
assumptions/rights). 

This can be seen from their support for wage labour, the reduction of
human activity to a commodity on the market. While paying lip service 
to liberty and life, right-libertarianism justifies the commodification 
of labour and life, which within a system of capitalist property rights
can result in the treating of people as means to an end as opposed 
to an end in themselves (see sections F.2 and F.3.1). 

And as Bookchin points out, "in an age of sharply conflicting values and
emotionally charges ideals, such a way of reasoning is often repellent. 
Dogmatism, authoritarianism, and fear seem all-pervasive." [Ibid., p. 68]
Right-Libertarianism provides more than enough evidence for Bookchin's 
summary with its support for authoritarian social relationships, hierarchy
and even slavery (see section F.2).

This mechanical viewpoint is also reflected in their lack of appreciation 
that social institutions and relationships evolve over time and, sometimes,
fundamentally change. This can best be seen from property. Right-libertarians
fail to see that over time (in the words of Proudhon) property "changed
its nature." Originally, "the word *property* was synonymous with . . .
*individual possession*" but it became more "complex" and turned into 
*private property* -- "the right to use it by his neighbour's labour." 
The changing of use-rights to (capitalist) property rights created relations
of domination and exploitation between people absent before. For the
right-Libertarian, both the tools of the self-employed artisan and the 
capital of a transnational corporation are both forms of "property" and 
(so) basically identical. In practice, of course, the social relations 
they create and the impact they have on society are totally different. 
Thus the mechanical mind-set of right-Libertarianism fails to understand
how institutions, like property, evolve and come to replace whatever 
freedom enhancing features they had with oppression (indeed, von Mises
argued that "[t]here may possibly be a difference of opinion about
whether a particular institution is socially beneficial or harmful. But
once it has been judged [by whom, we ask] beneficial, one can no longer
contend that, for some inexplicable reason, it must be condemned as 
immoral." [_Liberalism_, p. 34] So much for evolution and change!).

Anarchism, in contrast, is based upon the importance of critical thought 
informed by an awareness that life is in a constant process of change. This 
means that our ideas on human society must be informed by the facts, not by 
what we wish was true. For Bookchin, an evaluation of conventional wisdom 
(as expressed in "the law of identity") is essential and its conclusions 
have "enormous importance for how we behave as ethical beings, the nature 
of nature, and our place in the natural world. Moreover. . . these issues 
directly affect the kind of society, sensibility, and lifeways we wish to 
foster." [Bookchin, Op. Cit., pp. 69-70]

Bookchin is correct. While anarchists oppose hierarchy in the name of 
liberty, right-libertarians support authority and hierarchy, all of which 
deny freedom and restrict individual development. This is unsurprising 
because the right-libertarian ideology rejects change and critical thought 
based upon the scientific method and so is fundamentally *anti-life* in 
its assumptions and *anti-human* in its method. Far from being a libertarian 
set of ideas, right-Libertarianism is a mechanical set of dogmas that deny 
the fundamental nature of life (namely change) and of individuality (namely 
critical thought and freedom). Moreover, in practice their system of 
(capitalist) rights would soon result in extensive restrictions on liberty 
and authoritarian social relationships (see sections F.2 and F.3) -- a 
strange result of a theory proclaiming itself "libertarian" but one 
consistent with its methodology.

From a wider viewpoint, such a rejection of liberty by right-libertarians 
is unsurprising. They do, after all, support capitalism. Capitalism 
produces an inverted set of ethics, one in which capital (dead labour) is
more important that people (living labour). After all, workers are usually 
easier to replace than investments in capital and the person who owns
capital commands the person who "only" owns his life and productive 
abilities. And as Oscar Wilde once noted, crimes against property "are 
the crimes that the English law, valuing what a man has more than what 
a man is, punishes with the harshest and most horrible severity." [_The 
Soul of Man Under Socialism_, p. 1182] 

This mentality is reflected in right-libertarianism when it claims that 
stealing food is a crime while starving to death (due to the action of 
market forces/power and property rights) is no infringement of your rights 
(see section F.4.2 for a similar argument with regards to water). It can 
also be seen when right-libertarian's claim that the taxation "of earnings 
from labour" (e.g. of one dollar from a millionaire) is "*on a par with* 
forced labour" [Nozick, Op. Cit., p. 169] while working in a sweatshop 
for 14 hours a day (enriching said millionaire) does not affect your 
liberty as you "consent" to it due to market forces (although, of course, 
many rich people have earned their money *without* labouring themselves -- 
their earnings derive from the wage labour of others so would taxing
those, non-labour, earnings be "forced labour"?) Interestingly, the
Individualist Anarchist Ben Tucker argued that an income tax was "a 
recognition of the fact that industrial freedom and equality of
opportunity no longer exist here [in the USA in the 1890s] even in
the imperfect state in which they once did exist" [quoted by James
Martin, _Men Against the State_, p. 263] which suggests a somewhat
different viewpoint on this matter than Nozick or Rothbard.

That capitalism produces an inverted set of ethics can be seen when the
Ford produced the Pinto. The Pinto had a flaw in it which meant that if
it was hit in a certain way in a crash the fuel tank exploded. The Ford
company decided it was more "economically viable" to produce that car and
pay damages to those who were injured or the relatives of those who died 
than pay to change the invested capital. The needs for the owners of 
capital to make a profit came before the needs of the living. Similarly, 
bosses often hire people to perform unsafe work in dangerous conditions
and fire them if they protest. Right-libertarian ideology is the 
philosophical equivalent. Its dogma is "capital" and it comes before 
life (i.e. "labour").

As Bakunin once put it, "you will always find the idealists in the very
act of practical materialism, while you will see the materialists pursuing
and realising the most grandly ideal aspirations and thoughts." [_God
and the State_, p. 49] Hence we see right "libertarians" supporting
sweat shops and opposing taxation -- for, in the end, money (and the
power that goes with it) counts far more in that ideology than ideals 
such as liberty, individual dignity, empowering, creative and productive 
work and so forth for all. The central flaw of right-libertarianism is
that it does not recognise that the workings of the capitalist market can 
easily ensure that the majority end up becoming a resource for others in 
ways far worse than that associated with taxation. The legal rights 
of self-ownership supported by right-libertarians does not mean that 
people have the ability to avoid what is in effect enslavement to 
another (see sections F.2 and F.3).

Right-Libertarian theory is not based upon a libertarian methodology or
perspective and so it is hardly surprising it results in support for
authoritarian social relationships and, indeed, slavery (see section 
F.2.6).

F.1.3 Is right-Libertarian theory scientific in nature?

Usually, no. The scientific approach is *inductive,* much of the 
right-libertarian approach is *deductive.* The first draws generalisations 
from the data, the second applies preconceived generalisations to the data. 
A completely deductive approach is pre-scientific, however, which is why 
many right-Libertarians cannot legitimately claim to use a scientific 
method. Deduction does occur in science, but the generalisations are 
primarily based on other data, not *a priori* assumptions, and are checked 
against data to see if they are accurate. Anarchists tend to fall into the 
inductive camp, as Kropotkin put it:

"Precisely this natural-scientific method applied to economic facts,
enables us to prove that the so-called 'laws' of middle-class sociology,
including also their political economy, are not laws at all, but 
simply guesses, or mere assertions which have never been verified
at all." [_Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets_, p. 153]

The idea that natural-scientific methods can be applied to economic and
social life is one that many right-libertarians reject. Instead they 
favour the deductive (pre-scientific) approach (this we must note is
not limited purely to Austrian economists, many more mainstream 
capitalist economists also embrace deduction over induction).

The tendency for right-Libertarianism to fall into dogmatism (or *a priori* 
theorems, as they call it) and its implications can best be seen from the 
work of Ludwig von Mises and other economists from the right-Libertarian
"Austrian school." Of course, not all right-libertarians necessarily 
subscribe to this approach (Murray Rothbard for one did) but its use by
so many leading lights of both schools of thought is significant and 
worthy of comment. And as we are concentrating on *methodology* it is
not essential to discuss the starting assumptions. The assumptions (such 
as, to use Rothbard's words, the Austrian's "fundamental axiom that 
individual human beings act") may be correct, incorrect or incomplete -- 
but the method of using them advocated by von Mises ensures that such 
considerations are irrelevant.

Von Mises (a leading member of the Austrian school of economics) begins by 
noting that social and economic theory "is not derived from experience; it 
is prior to experience..." Which is back to front. It is obvious that 
experience of capitalism is necessary in order to develop a viable theory 
about how it works. Without the experience, any theory is just a flight of 
fantasy. The actual specific theory we develop is therefore derived from 
experience, informed by it and will have to get checked against reality 
to see if it is viable. This is the scientific method - any theory must 
be checked against the facts.

However, von Mises goes on to argue at length that "no kind of experience 
can ever force us to discard or modify *a priori* theorems; they are 
logically prior to it and cannot be either proved by corroborative 
experience or disproved by experience to the contrary . . ."

Von Mises makes a similar claim in his work _Human Action_, namely 
that experience "can never . . . prove or disprove any particular 
theorem . . . The ultimate yardstick of an economic theorem's 
correctness or incorrectness is solely reason unaided by experience." 
[p. 858]

And if this does not do justice to a full exposition of the phantasmagoria 
of von Mises' *a priorism*, the reader may take some joy (or horror) from 
the following statement:

"If a contradiction appears between a theory and experience, *we must 
always assume* that a condition pre-supposed by the theory was not 
present, or else there is some error in our observation. The disagreement 
between the theory and the facts of experience frequently forces us to think
through the problems of the theory again. *But so long as a rethinking of 
the theory uncovers no errors in our thinking, we are not entitled to doubt 
its truth*" [emphasis added -- the quotes presented here are cited 
in _Ideology and Method in Economics_ by Homa Katouzian, pp. 39-40]

In other words, if reality is in conflict with your ideas, do not adjust 
your views because reality must be at fault! The scientific method would 
be to revise the theory in light of the facts. It is not scientific to
reject the facts in light of the theory! 

Von Mises rejects the scientific approach as do all Austrian Economists.
Murray Rothbard states approvingly that "Mises indeed held not only that 
economic theory does not need to be 'tested' by historical fact but also 
that it *cannot* be so tested." ["Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian 
Economics" in _The Foundation of Modern Austrian Economics_, p. 32]
Similarly, von Hayek wrote that economic theories can "never be verified 
or falsified by reference to facts. All that we can and must verify is the 
presence of our assumptions in the particular case." [_Individualism and 
Economic Order_, p. 73] 

This may seen somewhat strange to non-Austrians. How can we ignore reality
when deciding whether a theory is a good one or not? If we cannot evaluate
our ideas, how can we consider them anything bar dogma? The Austrian's
maintain that we cannot use historical evidence because every historical
situation is unique. Thus we cannot use "complex heterogeneous historical
facts as if they were repeatable homogeneous facts" like those in a
scientist's experiment [Rothbard, Op. Cit., p. 33]. While such a position
*does* have an element of truth about it, the extreme *a priorism* that
is drawn from this element is radically false (just as extreme empiricism 
is also false, but for different reasons).

Those who hold such a position ensure that their ideas cannot be evaluated 
beyond logical analysis. As Rothbard makes clear, "since praxeology begins 
with a true axiom, A, all that can be deduced from this axiom must also 
be true. For if A implies be, and A is true, then B must also be true." 
[Op. Cit., pp. 19-20] But such an approach makes the search for truth a
game without rules. The Austrian economists (and other right-libertarians) 
who use this method are free to theorise anything they want, without such 
irritating constrictions as facts, statistics, data, history or experimental 
confirmation. Their only guide is logic. But this is no different from what 
religions do when they assert the logical existence of God. Theories 
ungrounded in facts and data are easily spun into any belief a person 
wants. Starting assumptions and trains of logic may contain inaccuracies 
so small as to be undetectable, yet will yield entirely false conclusions.

In addition, trains of logic may miss things which are only brought 
to light by actual experiences (after all, the human mind is not all 
knowing or all seeing). To ignore actual experience is to loose that
input when evaluating a theory. Hence our comments on the irrelevance 
of the assumptions used -- the methodology is such that incomplete or 
incorrect assumptions or steps cannot be identified in light of experience. 
This is because one way of discovering if a given chain of logic requires 
checking is to test its conclusions against available evidence (although 
von Mises did argue that the "ultimate yardstick" was "solely reason unaided 
by experience"). If we *do* take experience into account and rethink a 
given theory in the light of contradictory evidence, the problem 
remains that a given logical chain may be correct, but incomplete 
or concentrate on or stress inappropriate factors. In other words, our 
logical deductions may be correct but our starting place or steps wrong 
and as the facts are to be rejected in the light of the deductive method, 
we cannot revise our ideas.

Indeed, this approach could result in discarding (certain forms of) human 
behaviour as irrelevant (which the Austrian system claims using empirical 
evidence does). For there are too many variables that can have an influence 
upon individual acts to yield conclusive results explaining human behaviour. 
Indeed, the deductive approach may ignore as irrelevant certain human 
motivations which have a decisive impact on an outcome. There could be 
a strong tendency to project "right-libertarian person" onto the rest of 
society and history, for example, and draw inappropriate insights into the
way human society works or has worked. This can be seen, for example, 
in attempts to claim pre-capitalist societies as examples of
"anarcho"-capitalism in action.

Moreover, deductive reasoning cannot indicate the relative significance 
of assumptions or theoretical factors. That requires empirical study. It 
could be that a factor considered important in the theory actually turns 
out to have little effect in practice and so the derived axioms are so 
weak as to be seriously misleading.

In such a purely ideal realm, observation and experience are distrusted
(when not ignored) and instead theory is the lodestone. Given the bias
of most theorists in this tradition, it is unsurprising that this style
of economics can always be trusted to produce results proving free markets
to be the finest principle of social organisation. And, as an added
bonus, reality can be ignored as it is *never* "pure" enough according
to the assumptions required by the theory. It could be argued, because
of this, that many right-libertarians insulate their theories from 
criticism by refusing to test them or acknowledge the results of such
testing (indeed, it could also be argued that much of right-libertarianism 
is more a religion than a political theory as it is set-up in such a 
way that it is either true or false, with this being determined not 
by evaluating facts but by whether you accept the assumptions and 
logical chains presented with them).

Strangely enough, while dismissing the "testability" of theories many
right-Libertarians (including Murray Rothbard) *do* investigate historical 
situations and claim them as examples of how well their ideas work in 
practice. But why does historical fact suddenly become useful when it 
can be used to bolster the right-Libertarian argument? Any such example 
is just as "complex" as any other and the good results indicated may 
not be accountable to the assumptions and steps of the theory but to other
factors totally ignored by it. If economic (or other) theory is untestable 
then *no* conclusions can be drawn from history, including claims for the
superiority of laissez-faire capitalism. You cannot have it both ways 
-- although we doubt that right-libertarians will stop using history
as evidence that their ideas work.

Perhaps the Austrian desire to investigate history is not so strange 
after all. Clashes with reality make a-priori deductive systems implode 
as the falsifications run back up the deductive changes to shatter the 
structure built upon the original axioms. Thus the desire to find *some*
example which proves their ideology must be tremendous. However, the 
deductive a-priori methodology makes them unwilling to admit to being 
mistaken -- hence their attempts to downplay examples which refute their 
dogmas. Thus we have the desire for historical examples while at the same 
time they have extensive ideological justifications that ensure reality 
only enters their world-view when it agrees with them. In practice,
the latter wins as real-life refuses to be boxed into their dogmas
and deductions.

Of course it is sometimes argued that it is *complex* data that is
the problem. Let use assume that this is the case. It is argued that
when dealing with complex information it is impossible to use aggregate 
data without first having more simple assumptions (i.e. that "humans
act"). Due to the complexity of the situation, it is argued, it is 
impossible to aggregate data because this hides the individual activities 
that creates it. Thus "complex" data cannot be used to invalidate 
assumptions or theories. Hence, according to Austrians, the axioms 
derived from the "simple fact" that "humans act" are the only basis 
for thinking about the economy.

Such a position is false in two ways.

Firstly, the aggregation of data *does* allow us to understand complex 
systems. If we look at a chair, we cannot find out whether it is 
comfortable, its colour, whether it is soft or hard by looking at 
the atoms that make it up. To suggest that you can is to imply the 
existence of green, soft, comfortable atoms. Similarly with gases. 
They are composed to countless individual atoms but scientists do 
not study them by looking at those atoms and their actions. Within
limits, this is also valid for human action. For example, it would
be crazy to maintain from historical data that interest rates will
be a certain percentage a week but it is valid to maintain that 
interest rates are known to be related to certain variables in certain
ways. Or that certain experiences will tend to result in certain forms
of psychological damage. General tendencies and "rules of thumb" can
be evolved from such study and these can be used to *guide* current 
practice and theory. By aggregating data you can produce valid 
information, rules of thumb, theories and evidence which would be 
lost if you concentrated on "simple data" (such as "humans act").
Therefore, empirical study produces facts which vary across time 
and place, and yet underlying and important patterns can be
generated (patterns which can be evaluated against *new* data
and improved upon).

Secondly, the simple actions themselves influence and are influenced 
in turn by overall (complex) facts. People act in different ways in 
different circumstances (something we can agree with Austrians about, 
although  we refuse to take it to their extreme position of rejecting 
empirical evidence as such). To use simple acts to understand
complex systems means to miss the fact that these acts are not 
independent of their circumstances. For example, to claim that the
capitalist market is "just" the resultant of bilateral exchanges
ignores the fact that the market activity shapes the nature and
form of these bilateral exchanges. The "simple" data is dependent
on the "complex" system -- and so the complex system *cannot* be
understood by looking at the simple actions in isolation. To do so
would be to draw incomplete and misleading conclusions (and it is
due to these interrelations that we argue that aggregate data should
be used critically). This is particularly important when looking at
capitalism, where the "simple" acts of exchange in the labour market
are dependent upon and shaped by circumstances outside these acts.

So to claim that (complex) data cannot be used to evaluate a theory 
is false. Data can be useful when seeing whether a theory is confirmed by 
reality. This is the nature of the scientific method -- you compare the 
results expected by your theory to the facts and if they do not match you 
check your facts *and* check your theory. This may involve revising the
assumptions, methodology and theories you use if the evidence is such as 
to bring them into question. For example, if you claim that capitalism is 
based on freedom but that the net result of capitalism is to produce 
relations of domination between people then it would be valid to revise, 
for example, your definition of freedom rather than deny that domination 
restricts freedom (see section F.2 on this). But if actual experience is 
to be distrusted when evaluating theory, we effectively place ideology 
above people -- after all, how the ideology affects people in *practice* 
is irrelevant as experiences cannot be used to evaluate the (logically
sound but actually deeply flawed) theory.

As we indicated above (in section F.1.2) and will discuss in more depth
later (in section F.7) most of the leading right-Libertarian theorists
base themselves on such deductive methodologies, starting from assumptions
and "logically" drawing conclusions from them. The religious undertones
of such methodology can best be seen from the roots of right-Libertarian
"Natural law" theory.

Carole Pateman, in her analysis of Liberal contract theory, indicates
the religious nature of the "Natural Law" argument so loved by the
theorists of the "Radical Right." She notes that for Locke (the main source
of the Libertarian Right's Natural Law cult) "natural law" was equivalent
of "God's Law" and that "God's law exists externally to and independently
of individuals." [_The Problem of Political Obligation_, p. 154] No role
for critical thought there, only obedience. Most modern day "Natural Law"
supporters forget to mention this religious undercurrent and instead
talk of about "Nature" (or "the market") as the deity that creates Law, 
not God, in order to appear "rational." So much for science.

Such a basis in dogma and religion can hardly be a firm foundation for
liberty and indeed "Natural Law" is marked by a deep authoritarianism:

"Locke's traditional view of natural law provided individual's with an 
external standard which they could recognise, but which they did not 
voluntarily choose to order their political life." [Op. Cit., p. 79]

In Section F.7 we discuss the authoritarian nature of "Natural Law" 
and will not do so here. However, here we must point out the political 
conclusions Locke draws from his ideas. Pateman summary is worth 
repeating at length:

Locke believed that "obedience lasts only as long as protection. His 
individuals are able to take action themselves to remedy their political
lot. . . but this does not mean, as is often assumed, that Locke's theory
gives direct support to present-day arguments for a right of civil
disobedience. . . His theory allows for two alternatives only: either
people go peacefully about their daily affairs under the protection of
a liberal, constitutional government, or they are in revolt against a
government which has ceased to be 'liberal' and has become arbitrary and
tyrannical, so forfeiting its right to obedience." [Op. Cit., p. 77]

Locke's "rebellion" exists purely to reform a *new* 'liberal' government, 
not to change the existing socio-economic structure which the 'liberal' 
government exists to protect. His theory, therefore, indicates the results 
of a priorism, namely a denial of any form of social dissent which may change 
the "natural law" as defined by Locke. 

So, von Mises, von Hayek and most right-libertarians reject the scientific 
method in favour of ideological correctness -- if the facts contradict your
theory then they can be dismissed as too "complex" or "unique". Facts, 
however, should inform theory and any theory's methodology should take 
this into account. To dismiss facts out of hand is to promote dogma.
This is not to suggest that a theory should be modified very time new
data comes along -- that would be crazy as unique situations *do* exist,
data can be wrong and so forth -- but it does suggest that if your theory
*continually* comes into conflict with reality, it is time to rethink the
theory and not assume that facts cannot invalidate it. A true libertarian 
would approach a contradiction between reality and theory by evaluating
the facts available and changing the theory is this is required, not by 
ignoring reality or dismissing it as "complex". 

Thus, much of right-Libertarian theory is neither libertarian nor scientific.
Much of right-libertarian thought is highly axiomatic, being logically
deduced from such starting axioms as "self-ownership" or "no one should
initiate force against another". Hence the importance of our discussion
of von Mises as this indicates the dangers of this approach, namely the
tendency to ignore/dismiss the consequences of these logical chains and, 
indeed, to justify them in terms of these axioms rather than from the
facts. In addition, the methodology used is such as that it would be 
fair to argue that right-libertarians get to critique reality but reality 
can never be used to critique right-libertarianism -- for any empirical 
data presented as evidence as be dismissed as "too complex" or "unique" 
and so irrelevant (unless it can be used to support their claims, of 
course). 

Hence W. Duncan Reekie's argument (quoting leading Austrian economist 
Israel Kirzner) that "empirical work 'has the function of establishing 
the *applicability* of particular theorems, and thus *illustrating* their 
operation' . . . Confirmation of theory is not possible because there is no 
constants in human action, nor is it necessary because theorems themselves 
describe relationships logically developed from hypothesised conditions. 
Failure of a logically derived axiom to fit the facts does not render 
it invalid, rather it 'might merely indicate inapplicability' to the 
circumstances of the case.'" [_Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty_, p. 31]

So, if facts confirm your theory, your theory is right. If facts do not 
confirm your theory, it is still right but just not applicable in this case! 
Which has the handy side effect of ensuring that facts can *only* be used 
to support the ideology, *never* to refute it (which is, according to this
perspective, impossible anyway). As Karl Popper argued, a "theory 
which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific."
[_Conjectures and Refutations_, p. 36] In other words (as we noted 
above), if reality contradicts your theory, ignore reality! 

Kropotkin hoped "that those who believe in [current economic doctrines]
will themselves become convinced of their error as soon as they come 
to see the necessity of verifying their quantitative deductions by 
quantitative investigation." [Op. Cit., p. 178] However, the Austrian
approach builds so many barriers to this that it is doubtful that
this will occur. Indeed, right-libertarianism, with its focus on exchange
rather than its consequences, seems to be based upon justifying domination
in terms of their deductions than analysing what freedom actually means 
in terms of human existence (see section F.2 for a fuller discussion).

The real question is why are such theories taken seriously and arouse 
such interest. Why are they not simply dismissed out of hand, given their
methodology and the authoritarian conclusions they produce? The answer is, 
in part, that feeble arguments can easily pass for convincing when they
are on the same side as the prevailing sentiment and social system. And, of
course, there is the utility of such theories for ruling elites - "[a]n 
ideological defence of privileges, exploitation, and private power will be 
welcomed, regardless of its merits." [Noam Chomsky, _The Chomsky Reader_,
p. 188]

F.2 What do "anarcho"-capitalists mean by "freedom"?

For "anarcho"-capitalists, the concept of freedom is limited to the idea
of "freedom from."  For them, freedom means simply freedom from the
"initiation of force," or the "non-aggression against anyone's person and
property." [Murray Rothbard, _For a New Liberty_, p. 23] The notion that
real freedom must combine both freedom "to" *and* freedom "from" is
missing in their ideology, as is the social context of the so-called
freedom they defend.

Before starting, it is useful to quote Alan Haworth when he notes that
"[i]n fact, it is surprising how *little* close attention the concept 
of freedom receives from libertarian writers. Once again _Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia_ is a case in point. The word 'freedom' doesn't 
even appear in the index. The word 'liberty' appears, but only to 
refer the reader to the 'Wilt Chamberlain' passage. In a supposedly 
'libertarian' work, this is more than surprising. It is truly 
remarkable." [_Anti-Libertarianism_, p. 95] 

Why this is the case can be seen from how the "anarcho"-capitalist 
defines freedom.

In a right-libertarian or "anarcho"-capitalist society, freedom is
considered to be a product of property. As Murray Rothbard puts it, "the
libertarian defines the concept of 'freedom' or 'liberty'. . .[as a]
condition in which a person's ownership rights in his body and his
legitimate material property rights are not invaded, are not aggressed
against. . . . Freedom and unrestricted property rights go hand in hand."
[Op. Cit., p.41]

This definition has some problems, however. In such a society, one cannot
(legitimately) do anything with or on another's property if the owner
prohibits it.  This means that an individual's only *guaranteed* freedom
is determined by the amount of property that he or she owns. This has the
consequence that someone with no property has no guaranteed freedom at
all (beyond, of course, the freedom not to be murdered or otherwise 
harmed by the deliberate acts of others). In other words, a distribution 
of property is a distribution of freedom, as the right-libertarians 
themselves define it. It strikes anarchists as strange that an ideology 
that claims to be committed to promoting freedom entails the conclusion 
that some people should be more free than others. However, this is the 
logical implication of their view, which raises a serious doubt as to 
whether "anarcho"-capitalists are actually interested in freedom. 

Looking at Rothbard's definition of "liberty" quoted above, we can 
see that freedom is actually no longer considered to be a fundamental,
independent concept.  Instead, freedom is a derivative of something 
more fundamental, namely the "legitimate rights" of an individual, 
which are identified as property rights.  In other words, given that 
"anarcho"-capitalists and right libertarians in general consider the 
right to property as "absolute," it follows that freedom and property 
become one and the same.  This suggests an alternative name for the right
Libertarian, namely "Propertarian." And, needless to say, if we do not 
accept the right-libertarians' view of what constitutes "legitimate" 
"rights," then their claim to be defenders of liberty is weak.

Another important implication of this "liberty as property" concept is
that it produces a strangely alienated concept of freedom. Liberty, as 
we noted, is no longer considered absolute, but a derivative of property 
-- which has the important consequence that you can "sell" your liberty 
and still be considered free by the ideology. This concept of liberty
(namely "liberty as property") is usually termed "self-ownership." But, 
to state the obvious, I do not "own" myself, as if were an object somehow 
separable from my subjectivity -- I *am* myself. However, the concept of 
"self-ownership" is handy for justifying various forms of domination and 
oppression -- for by agreeing (usually under the force of circumstances, 
we must note) to certain contracts, an individual can "sell" (or rent out) 
themselves to others (for example, when workers sell their labour power to 
capitalists on the "free market"). In effect, "self-ownership" becomes the 
means of justifying treating people as objects -- ironically, the very thing 
the concept was created to stop! As L. Susan Brown notes, "[a]t the moment 
an individual 'sells' labour power to another, he/she loses self-determination
and instead is treated as a subjectless instrument for the fulfilment of 
another's will." [_The Politics of Individualism_, p. 4]

Given that workers are paid to obey, you really have to wonder which planet
Murray Rothbard is on when he argues that a person's "labour service is
alienable, but his *will* is not" and that he [sic!] "cannot alienate his 
*will*, more particularly his control over his own mind and body." [_The 
Ethics of Liberty_, p. 40, p. 135] He contrasts private property and
self-ownership by arguing that "[a]ll physical property owned by a person 
is alienable . . . I can give away or sell to another person my shoes, my 
house, my car, my money, etc. But there are certain vital things which, in 
natural fact and in the nature of man, are *in*alienable . . . [his] will 
and control over his own person are inalienable." [Op. Cit., pp. 134-5] 

But "labour services" are unlike the private possessions Rothbard lists
as being alienable. As we argued in section B.1 ("Why do anarchists oppose 
hierarchy") a person's "labour services" and "will" cannot be divided -- if 
you sell your labour services, you also have to give control of your body 
and mind to another person! If a worker does not obey the commands of her 
employer, she is fired. That Rothbard denies this indicates a total lack 
of common-sense. Perhaps Rothbard will argue that as the worker can quit at 
any time she does not alienate their will (this seems to be his case against 
slave contracts -- see section F.2.6). But this ignores the fact that between 
the signing and breaking of the contract and during work hours (and perhaps 
outside work hours, if the boss has mandatory drug testing or will fire 
workers who attend union or anarchist meetings or those who have an 
"unnatural" sexuality and so on) the worker *does* alienate his will 
and body. In the words of Rudolf Rocker, "under the realities of the 
capitalist economic form . . . there can be no talk of a 'right over one's
own person,' for that ends when one is compelled to submit to the economic
dictation of another if he does not want to starve." [_Anarcho-Syndicalism_,
p. 17]

Ironically, the rights of property (which are said to flow from an 
individual's self-ownership of themselves) becomes the means, under
capitalism, by which self-ownership of non-property owners is denied. The 
foundational right (self-ownership) becomes denied by the derivative right 
(ownership of things). Under capitalism, a lack of property can be just
as oppressive as a lack of legal rights because of the relationships of
domination and subjection this situation creates.

So Rothbard's argument (as well as being contradictory) misses the point 
(and the reality of capitalism). Yes, *if* we define freedom as "the absence 
of coercion" then the idea that wage labour does not restrict liberty is 
unavoidable, but such a definition is useless. This is because it hides 
structures of power and relations of domination and subordination. As Carole 
Pateman argues, "the contract in which the worker allegedly sells his labour 
power is a contract in which, since he cannot be separated from his 
capacities, he sells command over the use of his body and himself. . . 
To sell command over the use of oneself for a specified period . . . 
is to be an unfree labourer." [_The Sexual Contract_, p. 151]

In other words, contracts about property in the person inevitably create
subordination. "Anarcho"-capitalism defines this source of unfreedom away,
but it still exists and has a major impact on people's liberty. Therefore 
freedom is better described as "self-government" or "self-management" -- 
to be able to govern ones own actions (if alone) or to participate in the 
determination of join activity (if part of a group). Freedom, to put it
another way, is not an abstract legal concept, but the vital concrete 
possibility for every human being to bring to full development all their 
powers, capacities, and talents which nature has endowed them. A key
aspect of this is to govern one own actions when within associations
(self-management). If we look at freedom this way, we see that coercion 
is condemned but so is hierarchy (and so is capitalism for during working 
hours, people are not free to make their own plans and have a say in what 
affects them. They are order takers, *not* free individuals). 

It is because anarchists have recognised the authoritarian nature of 
capitalist firms that they have opposed wage labour and capitalist
property rights along with the state. They have desired to replace 
institutions structured by subordination with institutions constituted 
by free relationships (based, in other words, on self-management) in
*all* areas of life, including economic organisations. Hence Proudhon's 
argument that the "workmen's associations . . . are full of hope both as a
protest against the wage system, and as an affirmation of *reciprocity*"
and that their importance lies "in their denial of the rule of capitalists,
money lenders and governments." [_The General Idea of the Revolution_, 
pp. 98-99]

Unlike anarchists, the "anarcho"-capitalist account of freedom allows an 
individual's freedom to be rented out to another while maintaining that the 
person is still free. It may seem strange that an ideology proclaiming its 
support for liberty sees nothing wrong with the alienation and denial of 
liberty but, in actual fact, it is unsurprising. After all, contract theory 
is a "theoretical strategy that justifies subjection by presenting it as
freedom" and nothing more. Little wonder, then, that contract "creates
a relation of subordination" and not of freedom [Carole Pateman, Op. Cit.,
p. 39, p. 59] 

Any attempt to build an ethical framework starting from the abstract 
individual (as Rothbard does with his "legitimate rights" method) will 
result in domination and oppression between people, *not* freedom. 
Indeed, Rothbard provides an example of the dangers of idealist 
philosophy that Bakunin warned about when he argued that while
"[m]aterialism denies free will and ends in the establishment of 
liberty; idealism, in the name of human dignity, proclaims free 
will, and on the ruins of every liberty founds authority." [_God 
and the State_, p. 48] This is the case with "anarcho"-capitalism 
can be seen from Rothbard's wholehearted support for wage labour 
and the rules imposed by property owners on those who use, but do 
not own, their property. Rothbard, basing himself on abstract
individualism, cannot help but justify authority over liberty.

Overall, we can see that the logic of the right-libertarian definition of 
"freedom" ends up negating itself, because it results in the creation 
and encouragement of *authority,* which is an *opposite* of freedom. For
example, as Ayn Rand points out, "man has to sustain his life by his own
effort, the man who has no right to the product of his effort has no means
to sustain his life. The man who produces while others dispose of his
product, is a slave." [_The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z_, 
pp. 388-9] But, as was shown in section C, capitalism is based on, as 
Proudhon put it, workers working "for an entrepreneur who pays them and 
keeps their products," and so is a form of *theft.* Thus, by "libertarian"
capitalism's *own* logic, capitalism is based not on freedom, but on
(wage) slavery; for interest, profit and rent are derived from a worker's
*unpaid* labour, i.e. "others dispose of his [sic] product."

And if a society *is* run on the wage- and profit-based system suggested
by the "anarcho" and "libertarian" capitalists, freedom becomes a
commodity. The more money you have, the more freedom you get. Then, since
money is only available to those who earn it, Libertarianism is based on
that classic saying "work makes one free!" (_Arbeit macht frei!_), which
the Nazis placed on the gates of their concentration camps. Of course,
since it is capitalism, this motto is somewhat different for those at the
top. In this case it is "other people's work makes one free!" -- a truism
in any society based on private property and the authority that stems from
it.

Thus it is debatable that a libertarian or "anarcho" capitalist society 
would have less unfreedom or coercion in it than "actually existing 
capitalism." In contrast to anarchism, "anarcho"-capitalism, with its 
narrow definitions, restricts freedom to only a few aspects of social life 
and ignores domination and authority beyond those aspects. As Peter Marshall 
points out, the right-libertarian's "definition of freedom is entirely 
negative.  It calls for the absence of coercion but cannot guarantee the 
positive freedom of individual autonomy and independence." [_Demanding 
the Impossible_, p. 564] By confining freedom to such a narrow range of 
human action, "anarcho"-capitalism is clearly *not* a form of anarchism. 
Real anarchists support freedom in every aspect of an individual's life.

F.2.1 What are the implications of defining liberty in terms of (property) 
      rights?

The change from defending liberty to defending (property) rights has 
important implications. For one thing, it allows right libertarians to 
imply that private property is similar to a "fact of nature," and so to 
conclude that the restrictions on freedom produced by it can be ignored. 
This can be seen in Robert Nozick's argument that decisions are voluntary 
if the limitations on one's actions are not caused by human action which 
infringe the rights of others. Thus, in a "pure" capitalist society the 
restrictions on freedom caused by wage slavery are not really restrictions 
because the worker voluntarily consents to the contract. The circumstances 
that drive a worker to make the contract are irrelevant because they are 
created by people exercising their rights and not violating other peoples' 
ones (see the section on "Voluntary Exchange" in _Anarchy, State, and 
Utopia_, pp. 262-265).

This means that within a society "[w]hether a person's actions are voluntary 
depends on what limits his alternatives. If facts of nature do so, the 
actions are voluntary. (I may voluntarily walk to someplace I would prefer 
to fly to unaided)." [_Anarchy, State, and Utopia_, p. 262] Similarly,
the results of voluntary actions and the transference of property can
be considered alongside the "facts of nature" (they are, after all, the 
resultants of "natural rights"). This means that the circumstances created 
by the existence and use of property can be considered, in essence, as
a "natural" fact and so the actions we take in response to these circumstances 
are therefore "voluntary" and we are "free" (Nozick presents the example 
[p. 263] of someone who marries the only available person -- all the more 
attractive people having already chosen others -- as a case of an action 
that is voluntary despite removal of all but the least attractive alternative 
through the legitimate actions of others. Needless to say, the example can 
be -- and is -- extended to workers on the labour market -- although, of
course, you do not starve to death if you decide not to marry).

However, such an argument fails to notice that property is different from
gravity or biology. Of course not being able to fly does not restrict 
freedom. Neither does not being able to jump 10 feet into the air.  But 
unlike gravity (for example), private property has to be protected by laws 
and the police. No one stops you from flying, but laws and police forces 
must exist to ensure that capitalist property (and the owners' authority 
over it) is respected. The claim, therefore, that private property in 
general, and capitalism in particular, can be considered as "facts of 
nature," like gravity, ignores an important fact:  namely that the 
people involved in an economy must accept the rules of its operation -- 
rules that, for example, allow contracts to be enforced; forbid using 
another's property without his or her consent ("theft," trespass, copyright 
infringement, etc.); prohibit "conspiracy," unlawful assembly, rioting, 
and so on; and create monopolies through regulation, licensing, charters, 
patents, etc.  This means that capitalism has to include the mechanisms 
for deterring property crimes as well as mechanisms for compensation and 
punishment should such crimes be committed. In other words, capitalism 
is in fact far more than "voluntary bilateral exchange," because it *must* 
include the policing, arbitration, and legislating mechanisms required 
to ensure its operation. Hence, like the state, the capitalist market 
is a social institution, and the distributions of goods that result 
from its operation are therefore the distributions sanctioned by a 
capitalist society. As Benjamin Franklin pointed out, "Private property
. . . is a Creature of Society, and is subject to the Calls of that 
Society."

Thus, to claim with Sir Isaiah Berlin (the main, modern, source of the 
concepts of "negative" and "positive" freedom -- although we must add that 
Berlin was not a right-Libertarian), that "[i]f my poverty were a kind of
disease, which prevented me from buying bread . . . as lameness prevents 
me from running, this inability would not naturally be described as a 
lack of freedom" totally misses the point ["Two Concepts of Liberty", 
in _Four Essays on Liberty_, p. 123]. If you are lame, police officers 
do not come round to stop you running. They do not have to. However, they 
*are* required to protect property against the dispossessed and those who 
reject capitalist property rights. 

This means that by using such concepts as "negative" liberty and ignoring 
the social nature of private property, right-libertarians are trying to 
turn the discussion away from liberty toward "biology" and other facts
of nature.  And conveniently, by placing property rights alongside gravity
and other natural laws, they also succeed in reducing debate even about
rights. 

Of course, coercion and restriction of liberty *can* be resisted, unlike
"natural forces" like gravity.  So if, as Berlin argues, "negative"
freedom means that you "lack political freedom only if you are prevented
from attaining a goal by human beings," then capitalism is indeed based on
such a lack, since property rights need to be enforced by human beings ("I
am prevented by others from doing what I could otherwise do"). After all,
as Proudhon long ago noted, the market is manmade, hence any constraint 
it imposes is the coercion of man by man and so economic laws are not as
inevitable as natural ones [see Alan Ritter's _The Political Thought of 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon_, p. 122]. Or, to put it slightly differently, 
capitalism requires coercion in order to work, and hence, is *not* 
similar to a "fact of nature," regardless of Nozick's claims (i.e. 
property rights have to be defined and enforced by human beings, although 
the nature of the labour market resulting from capitalist property 
definitions is such that direct coercion is usually not needed). This 
implication is actually recognised by right-libertarians, because they 
argue that the rights-framework of society should be set up in one way 
rather than another. In other words, they recognise that society is not 
independent of human interaction, and so can be changed. 

Perhaps, as seems the case, the "anarcho"-capitalist or right-Libertarian
will claim that it is only *deliberate* acts which violate your (libertarian
defined) rights by other humans beings that cause unfreedom ("we define 
freedom . . . as the *absence of invasion* by another man of an man's 
person or property" [Rothbard, _The Ethics of Liberty_, p. 41]) and so
if no-one deliberately coerces you then you are free. In this way the 
workings of the capitalist market can be placed alongside the "facts of 
nature" and ignored as a source of unfreedom. However, a moments thought 
shows that this is not the case. Both deliberate and non-deliberate acts 
can leave individuals lacking freedom. 

Let us assume (in an example paraphrased from Alan Haworth's excellent 
book _Anti-Libertarianism_, p. 49) that someone kidnaps you and places you 
down a deep (naturally formed) pit, miles from anyway, which is impossible 
to climb up. No one would deny that you are unfree. Let us further assume
that another person walks by and accidentally falls into the pit with you. 

According to right-libertarianism, while you are unfree (i.e. subject to 
deliberate coercion) your fellow pit-dweller is perfectly free for they 
have subject to the "facts of nature" and not human action (deliberate or 
otherwise). Or, perhaps, they "voluntarily choose" to stay in the pit, 
after all, it is "only" the "facts of nature" limiting their actions. But, 
obviously, both of you are in *exactly the same position,* have *exactly 
the same choices* and so are *equally* unfree! Thus a definition of 
"liberty" that maintains that only deliberate acts of others -- for 
example, coercion -- reduces freedom misses the point totally.

Why is this example important? Let us consider Murray Rothbard's analysis
of the situation after the abolition of serfdom in Russia and slavery in
America. He writes:

"The *bodies* of the oppressed were freed, but the property which they
had worked and eminently deserved to own, remained in the hands of their
former oppressors. With economic power thus remaining in their hands, the
former lords soon found themselves virtual masters once more of what
were now free tenants or farm labourers. The serfs and slaves had tasted
freedom, but had been cruelly derived of its fruits." [_The Ethics of
Liberty_, p. 74]

However, contrast this with Rothbard's claims that if market forces 
("voluntary exchanges") result in the creation of free tenants or labourers
then these labourers and tenants are free (see, for example, _The Ethics of
Liberty_, pp. 221-2 on why "economic power" within capitalism does not
exist). But the labourers dispossessed by market forces are in *exactly* 
the same situation as the former serfs and slaves. Rothbard sees the 
obvious "economic power" in the later case, but denies it in the former. 
But the *conditions* of the people in question are identical and it 
is these conditions that horrify us. It is only his ideology that stops 
Rothbard drawing the obvious conclusion -- identical conditions produce 
identical social relationships and so if the formally "free" ex-serfs are
subject to "economic power" and "masters" then so are the formally "free" 
labourers within capitalism! Both sets of workers may be formally free,
but their circumstances are such that they are "free" to "consent" to
sell their freedom to others (i.e. economic power produces relationships
of domination and unfreedom between formally free individuals).

Thus Rothbard's definition of liberty in terms of rights fails to provide
us with a realistic and viable understanding of freedom. Someone can be
a virtual slave while still having her rights non-violated (conversely,
someone can have their property rights violated and still be free; for
example, the child who enters your backyard without your permission to
get her ball hardly violates your liberty -- indeed, you would never know
that she has entered your property unless you happened to see her do it).
So the idea that freedom means non-aggression against person and their 
legitimate material property justifies extensive *non-freedom* for the 
working class. The non-violation of property rights does *not* imply freedom, 
as Rothbard's discussion of the former slaves shows. Anyone who, along with 
Rothbard, defines freedom "as the *absence of invasion* by another man of 
any man's person or property" in a deeply inequality society is supporting,
and justifying, capitalist and landlord domination. As anarchists have
long realised, in an unequal society, a contractarian starting point 
implies an absolutist conclusion.

Why is this? Simply because freedom is a result of *social* interaction,
not the product of some isolated, abstract individual (Rothbard uses the
model of Robinson Crusoe to construct his ideology). But as Bakunin 
argued, "the freedom of the individual is a function of men in society,
a necessary consequence of the collective development of mankind." He
goes on to argue that "man in isolation can have no awareness of his 
liberty . . .  Liberty is therefore a feature not of isolation but of
interaction, not of exclusion but rather of connection." [_Selected
Writings_, p. 146, p. 147] Right Libertarians, by building their
definition of freedom from the isolated person, end up by supporting
restrictions of liberty due to a neglect of an adequate recognition 
of the actual interdependence of human beings, of the fact what each
person does is effected by and affects others. People become aware of
their humanity (liberty) in society, not outside it. It is the *social 
relationships* we take part in which determine how free we are and
any definition of freedom which builds upon an individual without 
social ties is doomed to create relations of domination, not freedom,
between individuals -- as Rothbard's theory does (to put it another
way, voluntary association is a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for freedom. Which is why anarchists have always stressed
the importance of equality -- see section F.3 for details).

So while facts of nature can restrict your options and freedom, it is the 
circumstances within which they act and the options they limit that are 
important (a person trapped at the bottom of a pit is unfree as the options 
available are so few; the lame person is free because their available options 
are extensive). In the same manner, the facts of society can and do restrict 
your freedom because they are the products of human action and are defined 
and protected by human institutions, it is the circumstances within which 
individuals make their decisions and the social relationships these decisions 
produce that are important (the worker driven by poverty to accept a slave 
contract in a sweat shop is unfree because the circumstances he faces have 
limited his options and the relations he accepts are based upon hierarchy; 
the person who decides to join an anarchist commune is free because the 
commune is non-hierarchical and she has the option of joining another
commune, working alone and so forth).

All in all, the right-Libertarian concept of freedom is lacking. For an 
ideology that takes the name "Libertarianism" it is seems happy to ignore 
actual liberty and instead concentrate on an abstract form of liberty which 
ignores so many sources of unfreedom as to narrow the concept until it 
becomes little more than a justification for authoritarianism. This can be 
seen from right-Libertarian attitudes about private property and its effects
on liberty (as discussed in the next section).

F.2.2 How does private property affect freedom?

The right-libertarian does not address or even acknowledge that the 
(absolute) right of private property may lead to extensive control by 
property owners over those who use, but do not own, property (such as
workers and tenants). Thus a free-market capitalist system leads to a 
very selective and class-based protection of "rights" and "freedoms." 
For example, under capitalism, the "freedom" of employers inevitably 
conflicts with the "freedom" of employees. When stockholders or their 
managers exercise their "freedom of enterprise" to decide how their 
company will operate, they violate their employee's right to decide 
how their labouring capacities will be utilised. In other words, under 
capitalism, the "property rights" of employers will conflict with and 
restrict the "human right" of employees to manage themselves. Capitalism 
allows the right of self-management only to the few, not to all. Or, 
alternatively, capitalism does not recognise certain human rights as 
*universal* which anarchism does.

This can be seen from Austrian Economist W. Duncan Reekie's defence of
wage labour. While referring to "intra-firm labour markets" as "hierarchies",
Reekie (in his best *ex cathedra* tone) states that "[t]here is nothing 
authoritarian, dictatorial or exploitative in the relationship. Employees 
order employers to pay them amounts specified in the hiring contract just 
as much as employers order employees to abide by the terms of the contract." 
[_Markets, Entrepreneurs and Liberty_, p. 136, p. 137] Given that "the 
terms of contract" involve the worker agreeing to obey the employers 
orders and that they will be fired if they do not, its pretty clear that the 
ordering that goes on in the "intra-firm labour market" is decidedly *one 
way*. Bosses have the power, workers are paid to obey. And this begs the 
question, *if* the employment contract creates a free worker, why must 
she abandon her liberty during work hours?

Reekie actually recognises this lack of freedom in a "round about" way 
when he notes that "employees in a firm at any level in the hierarchy can 
exercise an entrepreneurial role. The area within which that role can be 
carried out increases the more authority the employee has." [Op. Cit., 
p. 142] Which means workers *are* subject to control from above which 
restricts the activities they are allowed to do and so they are *not* 
free to act, make decisions, participate in the plans of the organisation, 
to create the future and so forth within working hours. And it is strange 
that while recognising the firm as a hierarchy, Reekie tries to deny that 
it is authoritarian or dictatorial -- as if you could have a hierarchy 
without authoritarian structures or an unelected person in authority 
who is not a dictator. His confusion is shared by Austrian guru Ludwig
von Mises, who asserts that the "entrepreneur and capitalist are not
irresponsible autocrats" because they are "unconditionally subject to
the sovereignty of the consumer" while, *on the next page*, admitting
there is a "managerial hierarchy" which contains "the average subordinate
employee." [_Human Action_, p. 809 and p. 810] It does not enter his
mind that the capitalist may be subject to some consumer control while
being an autocrat to their subordinated employees. Again, we find the
right-"libertarian" acknowledging that the capitalist managerial 
structure is a hierarchy and workers are subordinated while denying 
it is autocratic to the workers! Thus we have "free" workers within 
a relationship distinctly *lacking* freedom (in the sense of 
self-government) -- a strange paradox. Indeed, if your personal 
life were as closely monitored and regulated as the work life of 
millions of people across the world, you would rightly consider it 
oppression.

Perhaps Reekie (like most right-libertarians) will maintain that workers
voluntarily agree ("consent") to be subject to the bosses dictatorship 
(he writes that "each will only enter into the contractual agreement 
known as a firm if each believes he will be better off thereby. The 
firm is simply another example of mutually beneficial exchange" 
[Op. Cit., p. 137]). However, this does not stop the relationship 
being authoritarian or dictatorial (and so exploitative as it is 
*highly* unlikely that those at the top will not abuse their power). 
And as we argue further in the next section (and also see sections B.4, 
F.3.1 and F.10.2), in a capitalist society workers have the option of 
finding a job or facing abject poverty and/or starvation.
 
Little wonder, then, that people "voluntarily" sell their labour and
"consent" to authoritarian structures! They have little option to do 
otherwise. So, *within* the labour market, workers *can* and *do* seek 
out the best working conditions possible, but that does not mean that 
the final contract agreed is "freely" accepted and not due to the 
force of circumstances, that both parties have equal bargaining power 
when drawing up the contract or that the freedom of both parties is 
ensured. Which means to argue (as many right-libertarians do) that 
freedom cannot be restricted by wage labour because people enter 
into relationships they consider will lead to improvements over their 
initial situation totally misses the points. As the initial situation 
is not considered relevant, their argument fails. After all, agreeing
to work in a sweatshop 14 hours a day *is* an improvement over starving
to death -- but it does not mean that those who so agree are free 
when working there or actually *want* to be there. They are not and
it is the circumstances, created and enforced by the law, that have 
ensured that they "consent" to such a regime (given the chance, they 
would desire to *change* that regime but cannot as this would violate 
their bosses property rights and they would be repressed for trying).

So the right-wing "libertarian" right is interested only in a narrow 
concept of freedom (rather than in "freedom" or "liberty" as such).
This can be seen in the argument of Ayn Rand (a leading ideologue of
"libertarian" capitalism) that "*Freedom*, in a political context, means
freedom from government coercion. It does *not* mean freedom from the
landlord, or freedom from the employer, or freedom from the laws of nature
which do not provide men with automatic prosperity. It means freedom from
the coercive power of the state -- and nothing else!" [_Capitalism: The
Unknown Ideal_, p. 192] By arguing in this way, right libertarians ignore
the vast number of authoritarian social relationships that exist in
capitalist society and, as Rand does here, imply that these social
relationships are like "the laws of nature." However, if one looks at the
world without prejudice but with an eye to maximising freedom, the major
coercive institution is seen to be not the state  but capitalist social
relationships (as indicated in section B.4). 

The right "libertarian," then, far from being a defender of freedom, is 
in fact a keen defender of certain forms of authority and domination. As
Peter Kropotkin noted, the "modern Individualism initiated by Herbert
Spencer is, like the critical theory of Proudhon, a powerful indictment
against the dangers and wrongs of government, but its practical solution
of the social problem is miserable -- so miserable as to lead us to
inquire if the talk of 'No force' be merely an excuse for supporting
landlord and capitalist domination." [_Act For Yourselves_, p. 98]

To defend the "freedom" of property owners is to defend authority and 
privilege -- in other words, statism. So, in considering the concept of 
liberty as "freedom from," it is clear that by defending private property 
(as opposed to possession) the "anarcho"-capitalist is defending the power 
and authority of property owners to govern those who use "their" property. 
And also, we must note, defending all the petty tyrannies that make the 
work lives of so many people frustrating, stressful and unrewarding.

However, anarchism, by definition, is in favour of organisations and social 
relationships which are non-hierarchical and non-authoritarian. Otherwise, 
some people are more free than others. Failing to attack hierarchy leads 
to massive contradiction. For example, since the British Army is a 
volunteer one, it is an "anarchist" organisation! (see next section 
for a discussion on why the "anarcho"-capitalism concept of freedom 
also allows the state to appear "libertarian"). 

In other words, "full capitalist property rights" do not protect freedom,
in fact they actively deny it. But this lack of freedom is only inevitable
if we accept capitalist private property rights. If we reject them, we
can try and create a world based on freedom in all aspects of life, 
rather than just in a few.

F.2.3 Can "anarcho"-capitalist theory justify the state?

Ironically enough, "anarcho"-capitalist ideology actually allows the state
to be justified along with capitalist hierarchy. This is because the reason
why capitalist authority is acceptable to the "anarcho"-capitalist is 
because it is "voluntary" -- no one forces the worker to join or remain
within a specific company (force of circumstances are irrelevant in this 
viewpoint). Thus capitalist domination is not really domination at all. But
the same can be said of all democratic states as well. Few such states bar 
exit for its citizens -- they are free to leave at any time and join any 
other state that will have them (exactly as employees can with companies). 
Of course there *are* differences between the two kinds of authority -- 
anarchists do not deny that -- but the similarities are all too clear.

The "anarcho"-capitalist could argue that changing jobs is easier than 
changing states and, sometimes, this is correct -- but not always. Yes, 
changing states does require the moving of home and possessions over 
great distances but so can changing job (indeed, if a worker has 
to move half-way across a country or even the world to get a job 
"anarcho"-capitalists would celebrate this as an example of the 
benefits of a "flexible" labour market). Yes, states often conscript
citizens and send them into dangerous situations but bosses often force
their employees to accept dangerous working environments on pain of 
firing. Yes, many states do restrict freedom of association and speech,
but so do bosses. Yes, states tax their citizens but landlords and 
companies only let others use their property if they get money in
return (i.e. rent or profits). Indeed, if the employee or tenant does not
provide the employer or landlord with enough profits, they will quickly
be shown the door. Of course employees can start their own companies 
but citizens can start their own state if they convince an existing state 
(the owner of a set of resources) to sell/give land to them. Setting up 
a company also requires existing owners to sell/give resources to those 
who need them. Of course, in a democratic state citizens can influence 
the nature of laws and orders they obey. In a capitalist company, this 
is not the case.

This means that, logically, "anarcho"-capitalism must consider a series
of freely exitable states as "anarchist" and not a source of domination. 
If consent (not leaving) is what is required to make capitalist domination 
not domination then the same can be said of statist domination. Stephen
L. Newman makes the same point:

"When the price of exercising one's freedom is terribly high, what practical
difference is there between the commands of the state and those issued
by one's employer? . . . Though admittedly the circumstances are not
identical, telling disgruntled empowers that they are always free to leave
their jobs seems no different in principle from telling political dissidents
that they are free to emigrate." [_Liberalism at Wit's End_, pp. 45-46]

Murray Rothbard, in his own way, agrees:

"*If* the State may be said too properly *own* its territory, then it is
proper for it to make rules for everyone who presumes to live in that
area. It can legitimately seize or control private property because there
*is* no private property in its area, because it really owns the entire 
land surface. *So long* as the State permits its subjects to leave its 
territory, then, it can be said to act as does any other owner who
sets down rules for people living on his property." [_The Ethics of
Liberty_, p. 170]

Rothbard's argues that this is *not* the case simply because the state
did not acquire its property in a "just" manner and that it claims 
rights over virgin land (both of which violates Rothbard's "homesteading"
theory of property -- see section F.4.1 for details and a critique).
Rothbard argues that this defence of statism (the state as property owner)
is unrealistic and ahistoric, but his account of the origins of property 
is equally unrealistic and ahistoric and that does not stop him supporting 
capitalism. People in glass houses should not throw stones!

Thus he claims that the state is evil and its claims to authority/power 
false simply because it acquired the resources it claims to own "unjustly" 
-- for example, by violence and coercion (see _The Ethics of Liberty_, 
pp. 170-1, for Rothbard's attempt to explain why the state should not be 
considered as the owner of land). And even *if* the state *was* the 
owner of its territory, it cannot appropriate virgin land (although, 
as he notes elsewhere, the "vast" US frontier no longer exists "and 
there is no point crying over the fact" [Op. Cit., p. 240]). 

So what makes hierarchy legitimate for Rothbard is whether the property
it derives from was acquired justly or unjustly. Which leads us to a 
few *very* important points. 

Firstly, Rothbard is explicitly acknowledging the similarities between 
statism and capitalism. He is arguing that *if* the state had developed 
in a "just" way, then it is perfectly justifiable in governing ("set[ting] 
down rules") those who "consent" to live on its territory in *exactly* 
the same why a property owner does. In other words, private property 
can be considered as a "justly" created state! These similarities between
property and statism have long been recognised by anarchists and that
is why we reject private property along with the state (Proudhon did,
after all, note that "property is despotism" and well as "theft"). But, 
according to Rothbard, something can look like a state (i.e. be a 
monopoly of decision making over an area) and act like a state (i.e.
set down rules for people, govern them, impose a monopoly of force)
but not be a state. But if it looks like a duck and sounds like a duck, 
it is a duck. Claiming that the origins of the thing are what counts is
irrelevant --  for example, a cloned duck is just as much a duck as 
a naturally born one. A statist organisation is authoritarian whether 
it comes from "just" or "unjust" origins. Does transforming the 
ownership of the land from states to capitalists *really* make the
relations of domination created by the dispossession of the many 
less authoritarian and unfree? Of course not.

Secondly, much property in "actually existing" capitalism is the product 
(directly or indirectly) of state laws and violence ("the emergence of
both agrarian and industrial capitalism in Britain [and elsewhere, we
must add] . . . could not have got off the ground without resources
to state violence -- legal or otherwise" [Brian Morris, _Ecology &
Anarchism_, p. 190]). If state claims of ownership are invalid due to 
their history, then so are many others (particularly those which claim 
to own land). As the initial creation was illegitimate, so are the 
transactions which have sprung from it. Thus if state claims of property 
rights are invalid, so are most (if not all) capitalist claims. If the 
laws of the state are illegitimate, so are the rules of the capitalist. 
If taxation is illegitimate, then so are rent, interest and profit. 
Rothbard's "historical" argument against the state can also be applied 
to private property and if the one is unjustified, then so is the other.

Thirdly, *if* the state had evolved "justly" then Rothbard would actually 
have nothing against it! A strange position for an anarchist to take. 
Logically this means that if a system of corporate states evolved 
from the workings of the capitalist market then the "anarcho"-capitalist 
would have nothing against it. This can be seen from "anarcho"-capitalist
support for company towns even though they have correctly been described
as "industrial feudalism" (see section F.6 for more on this).

Fourthly, Rothbard's argument implies that similar circumstances producing 
similar relationships of domination and unfreedom are somehow different 
if they are created by "just" and "unjust" means. Rothbard claims that
because the property is "justly" acquired it means the authority a 
capitalist over his employees is totally different from that of a state 
over its subject. But such a claim is false -- both the subject/citizen 
and the employee are in a similar relationship of domination and 
authoritarianism. As we argued in section F.2.2, how a person got 
into a situation is irrelevant when considering how free they are. 
Thus, the person who "consents" to be governed by another because all 
available resources are privately owned is in exactly the same situation
as a person who has to join a state because all available resources are 
owned by one state or another. Both are unfree and are part of authoritarian 
relationships based upon domination.

And, lastly, while "anarcho"-capitalism may be a "just" society, it is
definitely *not* a free one. It will be marked by extensive hierarchy, 
unfreedom and government, but these restrictions of freedom will be of a 
private nature. As Rothbard indicates, the property owner and the state 
create/share the same authoritarian relationships. If statism is unfree, 
then so is capitalism. And, we must add, how "just" is a system which 
undermines liberty. Can "justice" ever be met in a society in which 
one class has more power and freedom than another. If one party is in 
an inferior position, then they have little choice but to agree to the 
disadvantageous terms offered by the superior party (see section F.3.1). 
In such a situation, a "just" outcome will be unlikely as any contract 
agreed will be skewed to favour one side over the other.

The implications of these points are important. We can easily imagine 
a situation within "anarcho"-capitalism where a few companies/people 
start to buy up land and form company regions and towns. After all, 
this *has* happened continually throughout capitalism. Thus a "natural" 
process may develop where a few owners start to accumulate larger and 
larger tracks of land "justly". Such a process does not need to result
in *one* company owning the world. It is likely that a few hundred,
perhaps a few thousand, could do so. But this is not a cause for 
rejoicing -- after all the current "market" in "unjust" states also
has a few hundred competitors in it. And even if there is a large
multitude of property owners, the situation for the working class is
exactly the same as the citizen under current statism! Does the fact 
that it is "justly" acquired property that faces the worker really
change the fact she must submit to the government and rules of another 
to gain access to the means of life?

When faced with anarchist criticisms that *circumstances* force workers
to accept wage slavery the "anarcho"-capitalist claims that these are to
be considered as